

Military Intelligence

October-December 1984

TERRORISM
COUNTERACTION





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Features

6 Countering the Terrorist Threat

Rudolf Levy outlines the role of intelligence in terrorism counteraction.

8 The Ardennes 1944: Intelligence Failure or Deception Success?

Forty years after the "Battle of the Bulge," Col. Basil J. Hobar looks at intelligence on both sides during Hitler's last great counter-offensive.

17 Terrorism in Northern Ireland

1st Lt. Christopher Hennen examines the situation in Northern Ireland and how intelligence is gathered and used by the police and the British army.

24 Desert Forge '85

Elements of the 513th MI Group return to Fort Huachuca for training.

28 Hostage Negotiations and the Stockholm Syndrome

SSgt. Richard L. Stanley explains a phenomenon in which hostages and hostage takers ally themselves against the police.

31 Reflections on Recent Trends in Terrorism

Brian M. Jenkins discusses the ever-changing motives and tactics of international terrorists.

36 Bibliography of Terrorism Counteraction

Additional reading list by Dr. Bruce D. Saunders.

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Military Intelligence

From the Home of Intelligence

Volume 10 Number 4

October-December 1984



Desert Forge '85 (page 24)

Departments

- 2 From the Commander
- 3 From the CSM
- 4 Feedback
- 23 Crossword Puzzle
- 26 10th Anniversary
- 35 Cryptocorner
- 37 USAICS Notes
- 41 Officers' Notes
- 42 Proponency Notes
- 43 Professional Reader
- 45 History of the 513th
MI Group

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from the Commander



by Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein

The worldwide proliferation of terrorist activity and the increased terrorist threat to Department of Defense personnel and facilities mandate that the U.S. Army adopt a terrorism counteraction program. This comprehensive and standardized program must alert Army personnel to both the terrorist threat and measures to counteract it.

Under a Memorandum of Understanding between the Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center; Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center; Commander, U.S. Army Military Police School; and Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, we have been tasked to provide instruction in the role of intelligence in terrorism counteraction. Currently, such instruction is presented in the Military Intelligence Officers Advance Course, Military Intelligence Warrant Officers Advance Course, Tactical All Source Intelligence Officers Course, the Pre-Command Course, and the Senior Officer Tactical Intelligence Orientation Course. Because of the importance of the terrorism detection mission, expanded instruction is presented in the Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Officers Course and the Counterintelligence Agent Course. Additionally, intelligence in



terrorism counteraction instruction is under review for inclusion in all resident courses taught at the Intelligence Center and School.

Additionally, we conduct a two-week Intelligence in Terrorism Counteraction Course to provide an in-depth understanding of the terrorist, his ideologies, organizations, methodology and goals; and provide instruction in intelligence analysis procedures. This instruction enables intelligence professionals to identify existing terrorist conditions, assess changes in the existing situation, and predict, in a timely manner, changes in terrorist activity trends.

The emphasis on education in intelligence in terrorism counteraction will bear fruit in the increased capability of our personnel to assess indicators, and thereby provide advanced warning of terrorist activities. In this way, the potentially devastating effects of terrorist incidents will be minimized by real time counteraction procedures.

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



from the CSM


by CSM Sammy W. Wise

In these pages, and in many other forums, we in the military intelligence business spend much time discussing MI training, assignment philosophy, career progression, doctrine, new systems, and developments in MI proponentcy. My theme for this issue is the "Total MI Family."

In point of fact, this magazine is not totally dependent on MI MOS holders for its production. Military intelligence people are not all "green-suited," nor civilians that have hard skill MI specialties. We have true professionals, both military and civilian, whose talents are just as critical to our mission accomplishment as are those that have MI specialties. I did not type, print, or mail this article. I normally don't arrange my own travel, billeting, or payments for TDY trips. Most of our buildings and other facilities are in an excellent state of maintenance—clean, well lit, and air-conditioned. Support for our students and their training is superb. Our families are provided many services necessary for family life from the installations on which we serve. We are able to communicate with you and you with us. Military intelligence personnel require this outside assistance to do their jobs effectively. Those who tend to these matters as well as supplies, food service, personnel management, security, etc., are just as much a part of the "MI Family" as are those of us who hold MI specialties.

In addition, these unique "MI people" require career advice. They must have appropriate opportunity for career progression. They need training, leadership experience, and assignment variety. Too many times we only concern ourselves with sending MI soldiers first to available schools (PLDC, PTC, BTC). We cannot allow this to continue if we want a strong NCO Corps and a great Army.

Recognition in the form of commendations and awards is of equal importance to them as they are to anyone else. If our programs do not include these "MI people" on the same basis as intelligence personnel, we neglect a very important group in the "MI Family."



The proponent, Maj. Gen. Weinstein, and I receive a great deal of correspondence from the military intelligence community worldwide on matters of vital interest in the areas of training, doctrine, and personnel life cycle management. Those who support us within MI units also have proponents or career program managers who need this type of input on their constituents.

I write this to highlight the importance of our support people and emphasize the need for MI organizations to acknowledge their contributions and address their concerns with the same vigor and concern we expend in MI operational areas.

This is not an allegation that any of us are ignoring our support personnel or treating anyone unfairly. I do suggest, though, that it is in our vital interest to evaluate ourselves in this regard. Do all of our local soldier and civilian development programs work to the benefit of "all" of our people? Do proponents of other specialties hear from us on matters affecting their people in our organizations? Is information from DA or other proponents reaching their people in our organizations as well as our own? Do staff meetings, officer calls or NCO calls reflect the concerns and interests of all our "MI people?" Do they brief us on their responsibilities as much as we brief them on ours? Are social activities inclusive of the whole team? The effectiveness of our organizations, our excellent record of achievements in the past, as well as our expectations for the future are dependent upon the excellence of our support, both military and civilian. We must truly perform as "team" players. Together we can do almost anything, alone we can do almost nothing.

TAKE CARE OF THE SOLDIERS.

Editor:

Regarding Mr. Stephen Andriole's article, "Indications, Warnings and Bureaucracies," featured in the July-August 1984 issue of *Military Intelligence*, I think that the article says important things about both the burgeoning intelligence community, their relationships among one another, plus the tenuous relationships within the intelligence agencies themselves. I feel that the situations described in the article under the headings of "counterproductive priorities," "perennial redundancy," and "convoluted incentives" pose a threat to the future growth of both the reputations of intelligence analysts, and their role within the intelligence community. Today's intelligence analysts, I believe, are incorrectly viewed by some "managers" in the context of a "jack of all trades, and master of none." Unfortunately, all who choose to work for the federal government must fit into a prepackaged and closely regulated job environment. In effect, the intelligence analysts, both military and civilian, are cast to "fit" into an already established mold that can be broken only upon leaving the service or resignation.

I also feel that this phenomenon is applicable across the board, whether it be an intelligence agency or any other agency of government, bureaucracy has one prime tendency, and that is to grow. Growth that is sometimes not in a time-phased and organized way, but more like a snowball rolling downhill. Analysts are not the only group working for the government constrained by internal policies or politics. For example, I, too, work for a government activity and the methodologies used to conduct business and obtain promotions are in many respects almost an exact replica of some of the problems Mr. Andriole mentions in his article. There appears to be in almost any government activity an almost psychological obsession to "get there first" or to impress, the boss. I guess, after all, who wants to be second? And as far as government agencies cooperating with each other and sharing the fruits of their hard work, this usually occurs only after the psychological obsession phase is completed. Everyone knows we coordinate our work with many other government agencies but that doesn't necessarily mean we communicate. I began to believe from the tenor of Mr. Andriole's article that you enter the intelligence analyst field at your own risk.

Another important point not addressed

FEEDBACK

in the article is this one: that realistically the intelligence analysts are not considered by both outsiders and some insiders in the intelligence community to be part of the exotic side of intelligence, at least not in the same vein as counterespionage, counterintelligence, special or covert operations or even cryptography. How many master analysts can we say have made it to the top of the intelligence pyramid? The most that we could say about this is that the answer is none, and that the analysts tend to congeal at the mid-level of the pyramid. The general public has little concept of the role of the intelligence analysts; they have been trained to think in terms of moles, bad spies, good spies, and double agents in mostly fictional settings. On the other hand, there have been very few fictional or even nonfictional novels written about the labors and largely unheralded excellence of the analytical side of intelligence work.

Another important implication of the article is that when we speak of the amorphous mass called the bureaucracy, and its relationship to the analytical community, we come face to face with another facet of that bureaucratic mass I'd call the pace of high technology. High technology today is the major growth industry both in the government sector and private industry. But its rate of growth is, in my view, excess and tends to be considered by me as a form of mild threat to the future status of the intelligence analyst. This is because of our understandable, but never-satiated, surge for high technology solutions in the form of ever increasingly sophisticated automatic data processing systems. We have ADP systems to cure just about every man-made and possible nature induced problem. We have an ADP system for the battlefield environment, computers to control and monitor the firing of missiles, computers for war-gaming, computers for command and control purposes, and lest we forget, computers for early warning command centers. It can follow that almost any function can be programmed, but for the analysts, programming their functions into an ADP system diminishes their

work. This is because one of the primary functions of the analyst is the use of valid premises to form conclusions or simply application of the principles of logic. ADP programming is the building of an ADP system that also rests very heavily on logic, and I feel this is a conflict that in the future ADP can have the impact of substantially reducing the role of the intelligence analyst. It could be that when Mr. Andriole says that the intelligence community is being flooded with more information than it can effectively digest, many have, no doubt, offered the ADP solution to find a way out of this deluge of information.

In the same issue in which Mr. Andriole's article criticizes "perennial redundancy," another article, "Departmental Strategic Intelligence" by Mr. Arthur G. Peterson, says and I quote, "A diverse national intelligence community servicing numerous consumer complexes inherently has redundancy and ambiguity. Some of this redundancy is intentional, for example, the concept of competing analysis centers is well established as a national intelligence policy (see Executive Order 12333)." What we have here is one party complaining about gross redundancy within the intelligence community and the other party saying that an executive order compels redundancy. However, the proverbial saying that the "more things change, the more they tend to remain the same" is applicable. We can take some hope from the fact that propeller driven planes, fashions from the thirties and forties, convertible cars and many other things that were thought to have been rendered obsolete by the advance of science and technology are now again in vogue. They are among the many "old" modes again in vogue because they have proven more durable, cost less, and most of all and not the least they have proven **DEPENDABLE**. I'm convinced that this same turnabout will also be the obituary of ADP when in the future after the 12th generation of computer fails to satisfy our appetite for the ultimate and efficient system. Someone will come up with the idea to start doing things the manual way again. It may take us longer, but the

product will be better, and of course it'll be more dependable.

Michael S. Evancevich
U.S. Army, Retired

Editor:

I have read with great interest the letter of Capt. Edward M. McClure of the North Carolina Army National Guard in the April-June issue where he writes of the location of USAR MI and ASA units being due to an "accident of historical politics."

It would appear that the gentlemen is a newcomer to our business. In my personal experience, since 1951, MI and ASA units in the USAR have undergone at least 10 major reorganizations and relocations, some of them traumatic. Also, in 1963 during a planned merger of the National Guard and USAR, a review of the record will reveal that universally the various states declined to accept MI units as they were deemed "useless" for any state mission.

Almost without exception, USAR MI and ASA units are located where the local population and/or industry produces the multiplicity of specialized MOS required to fill these units.

CWO 3 George F. O'Connor
734th MI Company USAR
Pasadena, Calif.

Editor:

Capt. Michael Conrad's poem (July-September 1984 issue) amusingly detailed some of the tribulations which led to the creation of the 533rd MI Battalion, but it did nothing to clarify some of the confusion contained in the lineage preceding it at the top of the page.

One of the MI units originally associated with the 3rd Armored Division was the 503rd CIC Detachment (1944-1945) which earned campaign credits for the Ardennes (WDGO 114-45) and Central Europe (WDGO 116-45). When again active with the division in later years that unit was eventually redesignated as the 503rd MI Detachment and was active at least as late as 1974.

Meanwhile, on July 1, 1962, the 503rd MI Company (Security) was activated in Munich from personnel and assets of old

Region IV (later Field Station IV) of the 66th MI Group. The 503rd MI Company (Security) inactivated in 1965 and its AOR was absorbed by the 511th MI Company headquartered in Nuremberg-Furth. Is the 503rd MI Company (Security) lineally descended from the 503rd MI Service Company that was active in Tokyo (1952-1955) or from the 503rd MI Detachment (Linguist) that was active at Fort McPherson (circa 1950-1955)? Was the concurrent existence of the 503rd CIC Detachment, the 503rd MI Detachment, and the 503rd MI Company in the 1960s designed to confuse the Russians or us?

If today's 533rd MI Battalion contains the remnants of the old Tokyo (later Munich) 503rd MI Company, whatever happened to the old 503rd (CIC, INTC, INTEL, MI) detachment that was previously in the 3rd Armored Division, and the old 503rd MI Detachment (Linguist) that was at Fort McPherson?

Aside from which 503rd now makes up HQ Company, 533rd MI Battalion, I am equally confused about A Company. The lineage says A Company was the 856th ASA Company which was redesignated in 1974 from the 374th ASA Company in Augsburg. How does that relate to the 374th ASA Company which served in Vietnam (1966-1970) and later with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson before becoming A Company, 104th MI Battalion in 1980?

In this same issue of *Military Intelligence*, Col. Don Gordon accuses the Office of Military History of having an overzealous regard for unit lineage and honors. Perhaps they do, but damned if I can make any sense out of their end product.

CWO 3 Conrad R. McCormick
U.S. Army, Retired

Editor:

There is no bigger proponent of the Military Intelligence Company Team concept than the current Commander of the Pathfinder (8th Infantry) Division's 108th Military Intelligence Battalion. I argued diligently during the January 1984 G2/MI Battalion Commander's Conference for a J Series TOE and doctrine change to reflect this highly effective method of waging IEW combat. In my view, the value of decentralized operations, under an experienced IEW battle captain, with

centralized exchange of technical data, is obvious in the modern AirLand Battle scenario. Centralized control is not likely given the vaguely understood time-distance factors of a divisional battlefield (not brigade as seen at the NTC), and the obvious REC threat. In fact, centralized control in the face of the REC threat may well lead to early destruction of the divisional MI battalion.

However, the Army has taken away the option of the IEW Company Team with the AOE TOE. One line company cannot be Company Team organized to support two or three brigades of a division. Hence, centralized control using the concept of collection and jamming "clusters" is now a regrettable must, and CONUS divisional MI battalions should abandon their unrealistic practice of tailoring a company to support a brigade at the NTC. What is needed now is effective doctrine to fight the divisional MI battalion under AOE TOE using centralized control. The current draft FM 34-10 J is out of date and, in my opinion, requires major revision.

Lt. Col. Wayne E. Long
Commander, 108th MI Battalion
8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)



Countering the TERRORIST THREAT

by Rudolf Levy

Intelligence serves as the basis of all terrorism counteraction efforts. All subsequent steps, such as threat analysis, prevention, planning, and crisis management, are directly dependent on timely and accurate intelligence. Basically, terrorism counteraction programs have four major elements: prevention, deterrence, reaction, and prediction. Because of the clandestine nature of terrorist organizations, identification and prediction are the most critical and most difficult. However, total knowledge of terrorism, terrorist tactics, strategies, modus operandi, and past record are extremely vital in intelligence terrorism counteraction. To conduct successful counterterrorism and antiterrorism operations, it is absolutely essential to know the political, social, psychological, ideological, and economic factors that may be involved in the motivation of the individual terrorist or terrorist groups.

The primary mission of intelligence is to answer the basic questions of who, what, where, when, how, and why. The assessment of terrorist capabilities to conduct a strike and probable courses of action must be based on all available data including a full knowledge of terrorism, terrorist organizations, terrorist ideology, modus operandi, past activities, communications, and the security environment in which the terrorist must operate. Since the terrorist relies heavily on publicity and propaganda,

much of the essential information for analysis and assessment can be obtained from open sources.

The role of intelligence in terrorism counteraction does not end with the preincident phase, but must continue throughout the entire counteraction operation. Intelligence is especially important in hostage barricade and negotiation situations where the lives of innocent people may be endangered. It is obvious that intelligence in terrorism counteraction is not only for intelligence specialists. Knowledge of terrorism and its indicators can improve the overall terrorism counteraction effort, and serves as basis for individual and organizational security against terrorist strikes.

While the prevention of all terrorist acts is virtually impossible, much can be done to remove the causes of discontent into which the terrorist implants the seeds of destruction and violence. Frequently the causes of civil unrest are found in political corruption, social discrimination, economic deprivation, ideological differences, geopolitical thought, religious beliefs, and outside influences that promote the development of terrorist violence and revolutionary activities. The elimination of these problems through governmental reform, will often disarm the terrorist and strip him of his cause. The terrorist would no longer be perceived as a liberator of the oppressed or the provider to the poor. The destruction of the ter-

rorist mystique allows the terrorist to be recognized for what he is—a common criminal. On the international scale, diplomatic efforts and cooperation are vital steps in prevention. If a terrorist incident occurs, an appropriate response must be provided. Any overreaction can cause as much damage to the government as no response at all. A common terrorist objective is to create incidents in which the authorities are forced to overreact and use excessive force. The terrorists, in turn, use overreaction as propaganda against the government. An effective terrorism counteraction program depends on early identification of potential problem areas which appear innocent, but may develop into major confrontations.

Indicators, developed from the analysis of past terrorist incidents, are early warnings in the production of threat analysis and intelligence estimates. In many cases, such activities may appear as the normal exercise of our democratic rights and prerogatives. However, the political terrorist cadre is trained in the subversion of democratic processes to further its own purposes, often leading to the destruction of those very same democratic institutions. As such, terrorist violence is an embryonic stage of insurgency. Even when the situation develops further into open insurgency, terrorist activities may still play an important role. There are numerous

examples of this situation. There are three major goals in terrorism counteraction: identification, isolation, and destruction of the terrorist group. It is obvious that international and transnational terrorist incidents are on the increase. More Americans are being targeted and more are becoming victims. This is evidenced by the attacks on personalities of world stature, such as President Reagan, Anwar Sadat, the pope, missionaries and church leaders. The terrorist does not respect international frontiers, but will respect a solid terrorism counteraction program and a national resolve to stop terrorism. Only under these conditions will terrorism be deterred.

As we have observed, the prevention of terrorist incidents is a formidable task. A much easier task is to provide sound protective measures for potential targets. These protective measures fall into three major categories: increased security, target hardening and personal protection. In the early 1970s the United States and other Western nations were plagued by airplane hijackings. The terrorists recognized their success and were exploiting it. With the number of skyjackings increasing at an alarming rate, the possibility of a major catastrophe increased proportionately. To prevent skyjacking incidents, the number of security personnel at airports was increased and sky marshals were placed on aircraft. Both measures realized some success, but the skyjackings continued. The use of sky marshals called attention to the possibility of a high altitude shoot-out and certain disaster for passengers and crew. The problem was effectively addressed by instituting 100 percent searches, either electronic or manual, before boarding all aircraft.

This process of "target hardening" of aircraft met with considerable success. As a result of this success, literally millions of dollars were spent on "hardening" embassies, automobiles, and homes where vulnerability surveys revealed a significant terrorist threat. Although a wide variety of equipment is available, security is an expensive business. Considering the cost involved, the level of protection provided to the target will be based on the threat. However, experience has shown that alertness coupled with common sense and personal

initiative in taking security precautions is the best deterrent to terrorist acts against individuals.

One must remember that one of the objectives of the terrorist is to erode credibility in the present government. The ultimate goal may be to overthrow the target government and to impose the terrorist's choice of government. However, it is the nature of Western societies to listen to arguments. The first response of Western society to terrorism had been to ask whether the terrorists had reasonable demands. If so, shouldn't they be heard and their aims studied? The terrorist is quite aware that it is impossible to take the steps necessary to reduce the threat without in some way limiting civil liberties. He is also aware that any restriction used to counteract the threat by the target government provides fuel for an inflammable propaganda campaign which would highlight the oppressive nature of the response.

While these issues are relevant and have been addressed on a national level throughout the Western world, they do not address the reaction desired by the terrorist. Most Western nations have developed highly skilled, well equipped, and expertly trained elite forces to provide a tactical response to such incidents. One organization available for such action is the Counterterrorism Joint Task Force. These elite forces have been used in the past with considerable success, keeping loss of life to a minimum, while restoring peace and order. However, they have been forced to act within the tight framework of the law and under very strict government control. While the use of these forces has been and will remain a viable option, care must be taken to avoid a programmed response to terrorists.

There is evidence that the terrorist is quickly adapting to measures being used against him. Police radio monitors and sophisticated printing machinery capable of duplicating almost any form of identification have been discovered in terrorist hideouts. Countersurveillance and counterespionage techniques have been employed to prevent the detection of their activities or intentions. While a tactical response is an absolute necessity in some instances, the character of the response must be primarily based on the demands of

the individual situation. This is clearly recognized in the current DoD policy on terrorism, which states, "The Department of Defense does not release or comment on plans or circumstances under which the U.S. counterterrorist force may be involved in order to avoid compromise by terrorists planning possible defensive actions against the counterterrorist actions."

The usefulness of specialized forces trained in terrorism/counteraction tactics is severely limited without a good intelligence organization which enables them to forestall attacks, arrest terrorists, or react quickly if an incident does occur. The traditional functions performed by intelligence professionals are integral parts of every phase of any terrorism counteraction program. ★

Rudolf Levy, a native of Czechoslovakia, was a member of anti-Nazi underground organizations during World War II and later was a member of an anti-Communist organization. He was arrested by the Czechoslovak Secret Police and later escaped to West Germany after serving six months of a 15 year sentence. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1951 and was commissioned in 1961 with dual branch status of infantry and military intelligence. While in the Army, Levy served in Europe, Japan, Alaska, Korea and Vietnam and in various assignments in the United States. Levy is a professional linguist in Slavic languages and has conducted research and studies on international terrorism and political violence and Communist tactics and strategy for the past 30 years. He also teaches at colleges and universities and departments of public safety. Levy was educated at the Technological Institute in Prague, Heidelberg University, Geneva International University, University of Texas, and American Western University, studying Political Science, International Relations and Political Violence. Levy presently is a researcher, course developer and instructor on international terrorism and counterterrorism operations with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School here, and serves as guest lecturer at other military schools and installations.

The Ardennes 1944

INTELLIGENCE FAILURE
OR
DECEPTION SUCCESS?



Bastogne
Wiltz

by Col. Basil J. Hobar

In the early morning of December 16, 1944, the German *Wehrmacht* began its last great counteroffensive of World War II. This counteroffensive, later known as the "Battle of the Bulge," struck violently at weak American forces in the Ardennes region of Belgium and Luxemburg. The attack, by a force consisting of 250,000 men, 1,900 pieces of artillery, and 970 tanks, was successful at the outset because the Germans gained the maximum tactical surprise. *Generalleutnant* Fritz Bayerlein, commander of the respected *Panzer Lehr* Division, attributed this initial success to surprising the enemy as to the time and the place of attack. The Allies were also surprised at the magnitude and objective of the attack.

Historians attribute the German success at the beginning of the battle to a combination of factors. Some state that Allied intelligence failed completely. Others rationalize that the Allied performance was no more than could have been expected under the circumstances. Most historians acknowledge the German use of operations security and deception, and some describe it in detail. Often, however, German OPSEC and deception measures are viewed in isolation without linking them to the estimates reached by American intelligence officers.

For example, Dr. Hugh M. Cole, the official U.S. Army historian for this action, concludes in **The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge**: "The prelude to the Ardennes counteroffensive . . . can only be reckoned as a gross failure by Allied ground and air intelligence . . . Here the enemy capability for reacting other than to direct Allied pressure had been sadly underestimated. American and British had looked in a mirror for the enemy and seen there only the reflection of their own intentions." Cole does describe in some detail the German use of OPSEC and deception. However, he does not temper his conclusion by discussing the intelligence problem in conjunction with the security and deception plan. This is demonstrated by his discussing the intelligence situation under the chapter subtitle, "The Intelligence Failure."

Robert E. Merriam, writing in July 1947, is somewhat ambivalent in his findings. While discussing the German use of OPSEC and deception in **Dark December**, he summarizes that, ". . . the cunning German cover-plan 'Wacht am Rhein' . . . threw us completely off guard." Later in the book, while discussing the intelligence situation, he concludes, ". . . that the material on hand was sufficient to warrant the criticism that the intelligence officers were not fully alert."

John S. D. Eisenhower, writing in 1969, is more sympathetic towards Allied intelligence officers in his book **The Bitter Woods**. In his discussion of the intelligence situation under the chapter title, "Allied Intelligence is Befuddled," he concludes, "Despite the almost unanimous condemnation of Allied intelligence for those days, . . . one has to sympathize: little, it would seem, of a concrete nature could be gleaned from the evidence that was presented. It is difficult to place oneself in the position of any of those intelligence officers, who received large numbers of false and conflicting reports daily, and visualize putting one's finger on a map and saying, 'Sixth Panzer Army under Deitrich and Fifth Panzer Army under Manteuffel are poised in the Eifel.' The fact is the Allies were surprised."

Eisenhower's chapter on the intelligence situation does not mention the German use of security and deception. In chapters on German planning, he makes scattered mention of the German reliance on

surprise, Hitler's emphasis on secrecy, the selection of code names for the plan, and other security and deception measures. However, he does not attempt to relate these measures to their effects on the predictions of Allied intelligence.

The effective use of security and deception by the Germans was a key factor in their achieving tactical surprise. It follows that German security and deception were also directly related to the evaluations, conclusions, and predictions made by Allied intelligence officers just prior to the battle. Any evaluation of the performance of the Allied intelligence community should be woven into a discussion of German OPSEC and deception plans and operations.

The sector of the Western Front which traversed the Ardennes region was defended by six American divisions under the control of two corps headquarters. This comparatively quiet sector extended for about 85 miles between the towns of Monschau in the north and Echternach in the south. The entire Ardennes was in the zone of the First Army. The Ardennes was known as ". . . the 'Ghost Front'—a cold, quiet place where artillery was fired for registration and patrols probed the enemy lines to keep in practice. For two months . . . both sides rested, watched and avoided irritating each other," wrote William Shirer in **The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich**. It was through this sector that the German counteroffensive struck, primarily in the Eighth Corps area.

Hitler made the decision to conduct the counteroffensive in September 1944. German intelligence was aware of the weak American defense in the Ardennes and Hitler was sure that the Allies would be caught by surprise and overcome before they could recover. By September 25th, firm planning guidance had been formulated. The mission was to attack, penetrate the front, secure crossing over the Meuse River, and continue the attack to the west to secure the port of Antwerp. The zone for the attack would be in the Ardennes between the towns of Monschau and Echternach. All planning would aim at securing tactical surprise and speed. Secrecy would be maintained at all costs.

The tactical plan which finally evolved called for an attack by three field armies under the control of Army Group B. The Sixth Panzer Army would be in the north, the Fifth Panzer Army in the center, and the Seventh Army in the south. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies were to strike for Antwerp; the Seventh Army's mission was to protect the south flank of the Fifth Panzer Army.

German planners recognized that the Allied forces could not be equally strong all along the Western Front. They also realized that at the first signs of an offensive in the Eifel and the Ardennes, the Allies could terminate their major offensive operations elsewhere and direct strong forces to the threatened area. From this the German deception objective can be deduced: Prevent the Allies from reinforcing in the Ardennes sector. The Germans needed to take advantage of the weak American defenses in that area.

To provide a basis for tactical deception activities, a directive was published by the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW or High Command of the Armed Forces) on October 12, 1944. This directive, signed by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, informed German commanders on the Western Front that it was not possible to mount an offensive at this time. It was, therefore, important, it went on to say, that reserve forces be assembled in such a way as to guarantee complete success in the defense of the "West Wall." This directive also stated that strategic reserves were to be assembled behind the northern sector of the front and be considered OKW reserves. The true purpose of this directive, which contained movement orders for units and directed a logistic buildup, was concealed from all recipients.

On November 5th another directive was published to establish the deception story. It stated that a large scale Allied offensive was expected with the mission of securing a line along the Rhine between Cologne and Bonn. To counter this offensive, two reserve forces were to be assembled. The first of these, located northwest of Cologne, would prepare to attack the enemy penetration from the north. The other force, located in the Eifel, would contain the south flank of the enemy penetration envisioned. The force near Cologne would be made to appear the more important of the two. The force in the Eifel would be concealed.

These directives clouded the true mission of the forces being assembled. In the vicinity of Cologne the Sixth Panzer Army prepared for its mission to strike in the northern Ardennes. In the Eifel the Fifth Panzer Army prepared to strike in the center. The Seventh Army, then controlling the units defending the Ardennes front, would continue to perform that mission until the attack began. Then it would assume its mission to protect the south flank.

From these deception measures, then, the German deception story can be deduced: A major Allied attack will achieve a penetration and attempt to secure a line along the Rhine between Cologne and Bonn. The Sixth Panzer Army, the strategic reserve in the north, will counterattack the penetration on the north flank. A second strategic reserve force in

the south will contain the penetration from the south. The Seventh Army will continue to defend the front.

When this deception story is pondered in conjunction with the Allied offensive to secure the Roer dams, it is readily apparent that it had the characteristics to make it quite believable to Allied intelligence officers.

The Sixth Panzer Army in the north was the principal organization in the deception plan. Its headquarters remained ostensibly in the vicinity of Cologne, and four of its panzer divisions were actually assembled in this area. The bulk of its attack forces were assembled further south. Not all of the troop assembly operations were concealed in the Cologne area. Rail movements began in mid-November with some trains moving in daylight. Repairs of highways and roads were begun, and some of the civilian population were evacuated. All of these actions pointed toward the assembly of a strong force in the vicinity of Cologne to support the deception story.

In contrast, the assembly of troops in the Eifel was done with great secrecy. Troop movements were made only during darkness. Use of camouflage was extensive. OPSEC measures were employed widely and effectively. Detection of some of those activities was inevitable, giving credence to the deception story. The story called for the assembly of a smaller counterattack force in the Eifel.

The success of a deception plan is largely dependent on strict application of OPSEC measures. Camouflaging troop concentrations is one example. Constructing a false force concentration to create doubt is an example of deception. It is axiomatic, therefore, that deception must be complemented by stringent security measures. OPSEC is the foundation on which deception is based. The Germans knew this. The deception objective and deception story were cleverly complemented by the use of these measures.

The selection and use of code names for the operation is an example of an OPSEC measure intended to deceive. The Germans selected the code name *Wacht am Rhein* (Watch on the Rhine) to create the impression that the plan was defensive in nature. They changed this name to *Herbstnebel* (Autumn Fog) on December 4th. Moreover, the alternate name of *Abwehrschlacht in Westen* (Defensive Battle in the West) was used commonly during the planning phase. The Germans had used this name previously in connection with the bitter defensive fighting in the Aachen areas.

As the deception plan unfolded, the Germans prepared for the counteroffensive in strict secrecy. Planning and coordinating were done under rigid


security measures. Movement of troops, equipment, and supplies into the Eifel region was accomplished under strict OPSEC measures. The impetus for the extreme use of OPSEC measures came from Hitler himself as described by John Eisenhower in *The Bitter Woods*: "Not only from the enemy was the massive enterprise concealed; in order to insure airtight security Hitler insisted that the only people made privy to the plan were to be the staff working with him at Rastenburg and the necessary secretaries, clerks, and typists (all of whom were given oaths of secrecy carrying a penalty of death)."

In keeping with Hitler's wish, only those people with an absolute need-to-know were informed of the plan at successive stages and at the various levels of command. At the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, the few officers who had to know were informed on October 11 along with a few draftsmen and secretaries.

Representatives from several major headquarters on the Western Front were informed on October 22. *General der Kavallerie* Siegfried Westphal of OB West (the highest German headquarters on the Western Front, commanded by Field Marshall von Rundstedt) and *General der Infanterie* Hans Krebs, Chief of Staff of Army Group B, reported directly to Hitler and were briefed on the plan. They were required to sign the oath of secrecy. "Westphal and Krebs were in the toils of a security system as carefully conceived and executed as the combined vigilance of the armed forces and the Gestapo could make it," wrote Major Percy E. Schram in his unpublished European Command report called, "The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes."

On November 3rd the commanders of the three field armies which held the northern sector of the Western Front under Army Group B were called to what they believed was a routine conference. Before the meeting began, *Generaloberst* Alfred Jodl, a principal member of Hitler's closest staff, asked all persons in attendance to sign the oath of secrecy. This was the first time that *General der Panzertruppen* Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, had seen such a document. Thus did the commanders of the field armies involved learn of the counteroffensive.

At the field army level, only the commanding generals and their aides-de-camp, chiefs of staff, and operations officers were permitted knowledge of the plan. Again, the pledge to secrecy was administered. Corps commanders were not informed until early in December. An example of how this was accomplished is the case of the Sixty-seventh Corps, commanded by *General der Infanterie* Otto Hitzfeld. At the beginning of December, his corps headquarters was suddenly reassigned and ordered to a loca-



tion south of Cologne. Hitzfeld, after reporting to Army Group B headquarters near Cologne, was directed to report to the "Staff of Special Service 16" in a town 60 kilometers south of Cologne. (Special Service 16 was a division of the German army organization concerned with the rehabilitation of troop units.) When he arrived he learned that this organization was in fact the headquarters of the Sixth Panzer Army. That same day, December 8th, he was informed of the counteroffensive.

Division commanders were informed at various intervals in December. Regimental commanders were not informed until three or four days prior to the attack. Battalion commanders were briefed December 13 and 14. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers were told on the night of December 15 or the morning of the 16th, in conjunction with inspirational messages published by Model and von Rundstedt.

Thus did word of the great counteroffensive trickle down through the chain of command. Keep in mind that while this was taking place, troop units, supplies and equipment were being assembled west of the Rhine. Extensive use of passive OPSEC measures was made to conceal this assembly (except where it was not intended to be concealed) and to hide the purpose of the assembly from both Allied and German forces.

Passive security measures were varied and employed widely. Officer couriers carried all messages and orders. Telephone and teletype were not used even at the expense of reducing troop leading time. Special codes were used for the day and time of attack. These were changed frequently.

The Germans used active deception and passive security measures to mislead the Allies. They spread rumors. For instance, on December 7th the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* published directions to the Fifth Panzer Army to circulate a rumor. The rumor was to the effect that a German offensive was to take place near the city of Trier in January or February of 1945. The Germans used radio deception to simulate the activation of the fictitious Twenty-fifth Army in the Muenchen-Gladbach, Cologne, and Dusseldorf areas. The regrouping of field armies, the insertion of Army Group H, and changes in leadership were disguised through the use of cover names and unit designations. The actual meanings of these cover names were hidden from all but a few German planners.

Extraordinary steps were taken near the front line to cover the movement and concentration of troops. Terrain reconnaissance was strictly controlled and limited severely. Troop units were prevented from advancing too near the front by a restraining line. Those officers authorized to visit the front had to wear the uniform of the unit visited. Use of horse-drawn vehicles reduced noise.

Passive security measures were used until the attack began. The threat of detection increased as more and more units reached assembly areas and final attack positions close to the front. After dark on December 7th troops and equipment began moving to final assembly areas. During the long December nights, trains made trips to and from the front con-

cealed by darkness. To minimize desertion, soldiers from Alsace, Belgium, and Luxemburg were transferred to the interior of Germany. Roll calls, as many as five and six a day, deterred men from leaving without authority. Troops cooked with charcoal to prevent wood smoke from revealing their presence.

Orders for strict concealment were issued to units moving into the final attack positions. Movements were made at night. During daylight, units were concealed in wooded or built-up areas. Vehicles could move only to within specified distances of front. By December 10th the artillery was permitted to move to within four miles of the front. It was manhandled or pulled by horses. When the guns were in position, the troops obliterated the tracks leading to the positions. Armored divisions moved to their attack positions beginning December 12. Vehicle wheels and certain roads were padded with straw to suppress noise. Low flying aircraft engine noise was used to cover the noise of vehicle engines.

Infantry units made their final movements during the night of December 14 with some assault units not reaching the line until the night of December 15-16. The assault units were superimposed over the *Volks-Grenadier* Divisions, then holding the Ardennes front. Specially appointed *Tarnmeister*s, or camouflage officers, who had been active in the area for some time, toured the assembly areas to direct units into position and to ensure that camouflage discipline was enforced. Use of tactical road signs was forbidden.

Thus, there is no doubt that the Germans had a deception plan. Its effectiveness was proved when the attacking force achieved a complete surprise on



that cold and murky December morning. Allied intelligence did not predict or detect the attack. Were the Germans successful or did Allied intelligence fail?

The Allied Intelligence Situation

Whether Allied intelligence collected enough information on which to formulate a positive conclusion that an attack of such magnitude was about to occur will probably never be determined. The fact that the attack was not predicted or detected cannot be blamed on any one commander or intelligence officer. If it was indeed a failure, it was complete since no one concluded that the counteroffensive was about to begin. What was the intelligence situation on the Allied side? Did the expectations of the Allies reflect the German deception story? What were some of the other factors involved?

Because of the overconfidence it bred, Allied optimism is said to have contributed to the intelligence problem. By mid-September the Allies were very optimistic and felt that victory in the West was near. At the same time, the Soviets were inflicting great damage on the German armed forces in the East. This gave support to the Allies' belief that a collapse by the Germans was imminent. Even though increased German resistance at the West Wall defenses caused this optimism to wane somewhat, it was not eliminated. When the Allied offensive began to grind forward inexorably again in November, Allied optimism was rejuvenated. The Allies looked for a collapse by the Germans, not an all-out counteroffensive.

There are other factors to consider when examining the Allied intelligence situation in relation to

German deception and security. For instance, the Ardennes region as a prospective battle area was given little attention by Allied commanders. The terrain is hilly and wooded and not suited for armored and mechanized operations. The "Ghost Front" had been quiet since September. The German divisions identified there were considered weary and in need of rest and rehabilitation. As divisions were moved in and out of the area opposite the Eighth Corps, it became axiomatic to intelligence officers that these divisions were passing through to more active fronts. There were important operations to the north and south, but never in the Ardennes. Allied commanders considered the German commander in the west, Field Marshall von Rundstedt, one of the best soldiers in the world. They believed that he would fight a rational battle with his meager reserves in the defense of the Rhine obstacle. The Allies did not consider that Hitler, the real commander, was not rational. Hitler conceived the Ardennes counteroffensive, not von Rundstedt.

As early as October, the Allied intelligence community detected that fresh German armored divisions had been formed and moved to the Cologne area. These were believed to be reserves for the "Watch on the Rhine" plan, whose purpose was to counterattack the Allied offensive once it had crossed the Roer. During the last week of November, when the Allied offensive in the vicinity of Aachen and the Roer dams was blunted, the Germans appeared to have divided their strategic reserve. Intelligence identified 25 German divisions, four of which were panzer, and announced the arrival of the Sixth Panzer Army in the vicinity of Cologne.





The Allies agreed generally that von Rundstedt's armored reserves would be committed against the First and Ninth Armies in an effort to stop the drive to the Rhine. The Twelfth Army Group reached that same conclusion. On the other hand, there was less Allied interest in the Fifth Panzer Army. It was assumed to have been withdrawn for rest and refitting. On December 12, the Twelfth Army Group reported the Fifth Panzer Army in a location between Cologne and Koblenz. This intelligence picture developed by the Allies is significant when it is considered that the Fifth Panzer Army was assembling covertly in the Eifel under the stringent OPSEC measures described previously.

Recall, as well, that the First Army had the responsibility for a sector of the front which included the entire Ardennes region. On December 10th, six days before the counteroffensive began, First Army G2 Estimate Number 37 was published covering the period since November 20. Evaluate this estimate in view of the factors just described and the German deception plan. In a rambling first paragraph describing the general situation, the First Army G2 wrote: "His armored reserve appears to be quartered in houses and barns along the railroads generally in a semicircle from DUSSELDORF to KOBLENZ, with KOELN (Cologne) as a center point . . . It is plain that his strategy in defense of the Reich is based on the exhaustion of our offensive to be followed by an

all-out counteroffensive with armor between the ROER and the ERFT . . . Tac/R and ground sources further indicate a buildup in the BITBURG/WITLICH area . . ."

The First Army G2 listed the following as the capabilities of the Germans:

- The enemy is capable of continuing his defense of the line of the ROER north of DUREN, his present front line west of the ROER covering these dams, and the south along the West Wall.
- The enemy is capable of a concentrated counterattack with air, armor, infantry and secret weapons at a selected focal point at a time of his choosing.
- The enemy is capable of defending on the line of the ERFT and subsequently retiring behind the RHINE.
- The enemy is capable of collapse or surrender.

The G2 selected the first capability as the one most likely to be adopted by the Germans. Despite this, it is clear that the G2 judged that the Germans had the capability to counterattack in force. We can also deduce from this estimate that the G2 was not completely negligent in assessing German capabilities. However, his conclusion that the enemy would not use his attack capability until the Allied offensive penetrated more deeply into Germany was the very conclusion the Germans wanted him to reach!

The Eighth Corps intelligence officer also published an intelligence estimate on December 10th. From this more narrow viewpoint, the enemy capabilities were listed as follows:

- The enemy can continue the active defense of his present positions with forces now on his front.
- The enemy can make counterattacks to restore his present positions with the forces now on his front.
- The enemy can reinforce his front line strength with any of the forces now in reserve . . . and adopt 1 or 2 above.

The G2 selected number 1 as the "current" capability, or the one most likely to be adopted by the Germans. The G2 stated further that the enemy will continue defending until the Eighth Corps goes on the offensive: "Capabilities Number 2 and 3 will doubtless never be implemented unless the enemy feels that Eighth Corps is preparing to mount an offensive." He did not consider the enemy capable of conducting large offensive operations. Instead, the Germans were said to be capable of conducting limited attacks under certain conditions. The capability to attack was not totally disregarded.

We can now conclude that the intelligence estimates of the most directly concerned major headquarters, First Army and Eighth Corps, reflected generally the carefully conceived German deception story.

There were signs of a buildup in the Eifel opposite the Eighth Corps sector. Air reconnaissance detected a number of these. Although air reconnaissance was limited in the Ardennes region by weather and low priorities, it noted signs of increasing activity in the German rear area. Tracks of road convoys could be seen in the snow and no camouflage could conceal totally the rows of tanks. The Army Air Corps collected enough information to indicate that the bulk of German reinforcements were not moving to the Aachen area, but in a more southerly direction. But due to a lack of coordination between air and ground elements, this information was not integrated into the complete intelligence picture.

During the last few days before the attack, divisions in the Eighth Corps sector and elsewhere reported incidents which could have been interpreted as indicators of attack preparations. For example, the 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions reported increased vehicular traffic in the German lines. On December 14th a woman line-crosser reported to the 28th Infantry Division that the woods near Bitburg were filled with German equipment. This woman was passed up through intelligence channels as far as First Army Headquarters, arriving



on the day of the attack! Four German prisoners captured during the early evening hours of December 15 claimed that fresh troops were arriving and that an attack would be made on December 16th or 17th. Two of the prisoners were deserters, which experience indicated as usually reliable sources. Two were wounded and under the influence of morphine. Only four of these incidents were reported to Eighth Corps Headquarters. One incident, that of increased traffic, was briefed December 16 at 0915 hours at Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group. The counteroffensive was already underway.

Conclusions

In retrospect, it is not difficult to review the information which was available to the intelligence community and conclude that it failed to fulfill its mission. It is also not difficult to conclude that this failure provided the Germans with the surprise they so desperately needed. However, it is misleading to make such judgments without considering the German use of OPSEC and deception.

Army doctrine recognizes the importance of CPSEC and tactical and strategic deception. These techniques, when properly used, help commanders achieve surprise and protect their forces. The principal ideas conveyed by this doctrine should be integrated into any study of the Ardennes counteroffensive. We cannot discount or ignore the effect of German security measures and tactical deception operations.

The German deception plan was deliberately conceived with specific objectives, one of which was to gain the element of surprise. The Germans provided a false picture for Allied viewing, and Allied intelligence reports reflected that picture. It is apparent that the use of security and deception measures by the Germans was a significant factor enabling the Germans to achieve surprise. It follows, then, that any evaluation of Allied intelligence should include a full description of the German use of security measures and their deception plan. ★

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
TERRORISM



IN NORTHERN IRELAND

by 1st Lt. Christopher Hennen

The alarming frequency of terrorism, especially during the 1970s, has shocked the civilized world. But even more disturbing is the nature of the terrorist contagion: its abrupt appearance; the range of its effect; its apparent international networks; its acquisition and employment of diverse technologies, bespeaking almost a "science" of terrorism; and the universal vulnerability to it.



Terrorism is a lethal form of undeclared, clandestine and brutal unconventional warfare. Nearly all experts on terrorism agree that traditional methods of reacting to this threat, which places the very survival of democracy in jeopardy, are no longer appropriate. Success in counterterrorist operations depends on detailed, accurate and timely intelligence, cooperation of both the military and the police in its implementation, and incisive action by a central office with the authority to make and carry out decisions. The importance of intelligence had been recognized as early as 200 BC when Sun Tsu, the Chinese philosopher, wrote in his classic *Art of War*, "Know your enemy, and you can fight a hundred battles."

In a democratic state the most appropriate agency for the tasks of intelligence gathering, collation, analysis, and coordination is the police, since they, to some degree, enjoy public confidence and cooperation. More significantly, though, routine tasks of law enforcement and public order avail the police an unrivaled depository of background information from which an intelligence data base can be developed. However, the development of this reliable intelligence data base may have some serious pitfalls. If, for instance, the police have been controlled, administered and staffed predominately by one ethnic or religious group, they can lose the confidence and cooperation of key sections of the population. It then becomes difficult for the police to conduct normal law enforcement duties, and the development of an effective intelligence system is nearly impossible.

The official intelligence service in Northern Ireland is the Special Branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary which identifies and interrogates suspects. One of the main problems for the RUC has been to overcome its image as a partisan (Protestant) force. In theory, 33 percent of its members should be Catholic, while actually that percentage is much lower. A

heightened recruiting drive has attempted to ease the imbalance, but Catholic reluctance to join the police is in some ways analogous to the attitude of minorities in the United States, and reflects the traditional distrust of the police in ethnic neighborhoods.

When the RUC began its security mission in Ulster, the identification and pursuit of terrorists were hampered by inadequate intelligence-gathering organizations. Files held in 1969 by the RUC Special Branch largely recorded details of Irish Republican Army members active in the campaign of 1956-62. By the early 1970s when the current conflict had intensified, new IRA activists were unknown to the Special Branch. This created an almost debilitating intelligence gap and required the police to develop an entirely new intelligence apparatus. In 1976 a unified criminal intelligence system was developed to systematically collate and analyze information. Although improvements have been made in information gathering, the Special Branch remains understaffed and has experienced problems in penetrating the IRA.

A significant problem facing the security forces in Northern Ireland was the open border across which terrorists could move freely to sanctuary in the Irish Republic. The RUC complained that there were at least 100 men inside the Irish Republic who were wanted for various crimes and terrorist offenses committed in the Province, but the Irish courts refused to extradite any of them.

To aid in the identification of terrorists, the Criminal Investigation Division of the RUC has been reorganized and equipped with a new criminal intelligence and collation system. This computer surveillance bank is in use by the police in Northern Ireland. It collects and stores information about terrorists and suspects, their backgrounds, relatives, acquaintances, homes, careers, political persuasions, and general activities. This function has given the police and the British army access to information about

known terrorists and suspects and any unfamiliar persons. Furthermore, this asset permits agencies to identify potential victims and to implement measures to protect them. In the past, the rapid growth of technology tended to favor the terrorist in the promulgation of violence, but recently this trend has been markedly reversed. Although technology has provided the terrorist with an abundance of newly developed weaponry and targets, conversely it has also aided the state's efforts to strike back with authority and credibility.

In Ulster, as elsewhere, intelligence services rely principally on information from the public, and counteraction operations require unconditional support and cooperation from the public. The problem of neutralizing a terrorist operation and its supports hinges on the state's ability to identify the opposition. Once uncovered, they can no longer strike on their own terms but are obliged to dance to the tune of government forces. Frank Kitson offers this opinion: "If the government is at all slow in developing a system for identifying the insurgents they will probably survive long enough to attract the support of a significant portion of the population, and if this happens the government's task will become immeasurably harder." However, when the government builds up an effective intelligence network quickly, insurgents operating without the insulation provided by a sympathetic and committed public will be rendered ineffective.

A significant factor which impedes the success of government intelligence-gathering operations is the use of intimidation and fear by the terrorists. In Northern Ireland terrorists use intimidation as a security measure; kangaroo justice is still meted out and encouraged by the IRA. On Nov. 9, 1971, in Derry, three Catholic girls were tied to a lamp post, had their heads shorn, and then had red paint poured over their heads and upper bodies by a crowd of jeering women. This was explained as punishment for

being friendly with the British soldiers. Informers and defectors from the IRA and Irishmen serving in the British army have been priority targets. Tarring and feathering and similar punishments are imposed on those who betray the IRA code; "kneecapping" is used frequently as both a punishment and a warning to others. The IRA has also perfected techniques of selective assassination. Intimidation is not limited to the general public but is also unleashed against the police and the British army. In an attempt to destroy the potential for counterattack by these government agencies, terrorists resort to the strategic elimination of policemen, soldiers, and British intelligence personnel. This approach is not intended to be viewed as "propaganda by the deed," but rather as a practical effort to use guerrilla hit-and-run tactics to enhance the possibility of success for the IRA. These forms of intimidation have resulted in limited cooperation from the populace, although British security forces have attempted to use their own lines of overt and covert intelligence to deter this.

Overt intelligence involves background and operational intelligence measures. In Ulster, background intelligence is obtained by the police and the military as they become familiar with areas of patrol and the community. It involves observing and noting vantage points for snipers, escape routes, cover stories and families of influence throughout the area. In Belfast, for example, it amounted to noting the color of front doors, the color of window curtains, which houses had vehicles parked outside and other pertinent details. The police believe these methods to be valuable in confirming whether a suspect is a legitimate resident or not. There have been instances where apparently legitimate residents have been questioned, and their unfamiliarity with the community has been an accurate indication that they were terrorists reconnoitering target areas and safe houses or collecting protection money.


In Ulster, the overt system worked well and was enhanced by the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act which enabled the army by late 1974 to strengthen its security situation. The special powers legislation had enabled them to enter any premise at any time unannounced, and to subject anyone to questioning at any time for up to four hours. This method had obviously benefited the army intelligence network which had built up an impressive pool of detailed intelligence on over 40 percent of the population of the Province in a short period of time. This information was collected and collated in a centralized main computer based at Lisburn Army Headquarters. Much of this information was gathered by means of "P-tests," whereby subjects would be selected at random and required to provide such information as details of their families, friends, occupation, and religious and political affiliations and involvements. Head counts were conducted indiscriminately to scrutinize residents, while extensive overt and covert photographic surveillance was used.

This massive intelligence-gathering effort paid enormous dividends. In 1974, 71,914 houses were searched, 1,260 guns and 26,120 pounds of explosives were found. The Provisional's main explosive experts were inside Long Kesh Prison and the leadership of the Provisional's Belfast Brigade was upset by the arrest and detention of three of its officers. By November 1974, internment of suspected terrorists had weakened the IRA's organization; the army's intelligence effort had been so accurate that a substantial number of those arrested were, in fact, terrorists or IRA collaborators.

Unfortunately, this advantage was short-lived. After talks between Provisional leaders and government representatives in 1975, the British government imposed crippling restraints on the army's intelligence capability in Ulster. The use of "P-tests" was now forbidden; IRA suspects

could not be arrested unless probable cause existed; and photographing crowds or individuals openly was discontinued. Permission to enter and search houses had to be sought from Brigade Headquarters in Northern Ireland. The combined effect of these constraints has been to reduce the amount of vital information available to the security forces. Without this effective means of intelligence backup the security forces could not possibly hope to contain the large-scale terrorism that exists in Northern Ireland.

Covert intelligence is a classic and often controversial system of information gathering using informers, defectors, prisoners, infiltration and espionage. Walter Laqueur observed that, "It is the former terrorist, the renegade, who has traditionally been the terrorist's most dangerous opponent." This system had operated with limited success in Ulster during the initial stages of conflict when the terrorist network grew more rapidly than the intelligence-gathering apparatus could accommodate. After March 1972, the security forces had resorted to maintaining a low profile, and this impaired the already limited ability of the intelligence collection centers to develop sources of reliable information throughout the community. Perhaps the most spectacular covert intelligence network was the Special Air Service's activity in operating the Four Square Laundry. The SAS had set up a laundry service in Belfast, and with the assistance of the Women's Royal Army Corps, collected wash from hardline Catholic sections of the community with the intent of examining clothing for explosive stains in an effort to identify bomb makers and bomb carriers, and also for blood or any other incriminating evidence. This operation proved successful for a couple of weeks during the summer of 1972, until the operation was halted after one of the laundry vans was attacked and three SAS men were killed.



In response to a shortage of police personnel, the "B-Specials" were activated to assist the constabulary with the insurgent situation. These auxiliaries were used to guard key installations and posts, patrol the countryside, and strengthen RUC border and community patrols. The Catholics viewed the B-Specials as a partisan paramilitary force recruited exclusively from the Protestant community. They were held in contempt by the Catholics; some communities in Northern Ireland, especially in Derry, openly requested assistance from the Irish government to protect them from the RUC and the B-Specials. The dreaded B-Specials existed until they were officially "stood-down" on March 31, 1970, and were replaced by the Ulster Defense Regiment which eventually absorbed many B-Special members. Cooperation from the public is gained through trust and confidence, and when there is a sense of mutual understanding. Obviously, force cannot bring these things about. Effective communication is what brings valuable intelligence information to the police.

The British army assumed responsibility for the security of Ulster in 1969 at a moment when the local police had been seriously overtaxed and had come to the brink of total exhaustion. The first contingent of 500 British troops was flown to Northern Ireland to guard public installations such as reservoirs and electrical power stations from Protestant sabotage attacks. When the insurgency began the RUC had no counterinsurgency expertise. Beginning in April 1971 members of the RUC attended tactical intelligence training courses at the British Army Intelligence Center at Maresfield, Surrey. Among the special interrogation aids and techniques demonstrated were sensory deprivation methods such as restricting a suspect's food intake during internment, placing hoods over persons to confuse their senses and keeping a suspect spread-eagled against a wall for

extended periods of time. These techniques were known as "deep interrogation."

As the Provisionals gained a hold on Catholic communities, people were reluctant to volunteer information to authorities. Consequently, for a time, there was a lack of what was referred to by the British army as tactical intelligence. An effective method of relieving this problem was to establish a unit which could carry out two separate functions: setting up or reinforcing the intelligence organization; and providing persons trained to develop information by special means. Terrorism is a double-edged sword; experience in counterterrorist operations indicates that the best method for ferreting out the terrorist is to employ his own weapons—stealth and cunning—against him. This method requires highly motivated, expertly trained commandos, operating in small groups, equipped with the latest technology. They must be skilled in communications, electronics, methods of intelligence gathering, demolitions and weapons, and be familiar with terrorist tactics and behavior. Special operations are based on the principle of deep penetration, and the use of pseudoinurgents can be successful, providing that a reasonable intelligence organization exists on which to base it. Special operations can offer several advantages over the use of conventional forces, one of which is the ability to operate in an unobtrusive way. An obvious gap which a unit designed for special operations could fill would be in the research and development of specialized equipment which might be of value in countering insurgent operations. This type of equipment would include special weapons, communications systems, data storage devices for use in the collection and development of information, and other significant technological advances.

Countering the threat of terrorism in most Western democracies has traditionally been the responsibility of the police and available internal

security agencies or, in extreme circumstances, the military, which is trained to fight conventional wars but is hopelessly unprepared for anti-terrorist warfare. Contemporary military methods and the use of conventional troops are far too destructive to be employed in heavily populated urban regions. In the words of Cypriot terrorist leader, General George Grivas, "One does not use a tank to catch field mice—a cat will do the job better. The British Field Marshal's only hope of finding us was to play cat and mouse: to use tiny, expertly trained groups, who could work with cunning and patience and strike rapidly when least expected."

The British government, identifying a need for a special operations unit and for developing its full potential, quickly mounted effective commando-style operations in Northern Ireland, employing the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment. Reportedly the world's finest anti-terrorist commando unit, the 22nd was formed during World War II to operate behind enemy lines in North Africa; that later played a significant role in many of the colonial upheavals of the postwar period. Since the introduction of SAS units in Northern Ireland in 1976, British losses to the Irish Republican Army have been reduced appreciably. The "official" mission of SAS units deployed in Northern Ireland is surveillance and intelligence collection. The counterinsurgency teams operate in groups of four: a weapons specialist, an explosives and sabotage expert, a communications and electronics expert, and a medical worker. SAS personnel are equipped with special weapons, equipment, and surveillance apparatus, and trained to stake out positions for extended periods of time. The SAS has been accused by the Provisionals of initiating a program of selective assassination of members of both the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA in hopes of igniting an internecine conflict. In January of 1976 after a series of vicious killings in South Armagh,

along the Irish border, the British government ordered a 20-person detachment into the area. The four-person teams lived off the land while they patrolled the border and laid ambushes for IRA infiltrators. Additionally, raw intelligence was being collected constantly and forwarded to a separate central computer—a computer surveillance bank—which enabled information to be passed instantly to military and police authorities.

British government attempts at political conciliation have exasperated the problems of security in Northern Ireland. The British government and the military still seriously antagonize the Catholic communities, especially in sensitive border areas such as Armagh County. In an attempt to enact a series of political reforms as well as changes in army tactics, the armed forces converted to a low profile in Catholic areas, reducing its numbers almost by half. This initiative met with immediate controversy and enraged the Protestant and Loyalist extremists who foresaw the British government taking a "softened," almost resigned, approach towards the army's security commitment. To an army engaged in the defeat of terrorism the modified approach presented problems. The reduction in street patrols and overt surveillance and the elimination of hot pursuit relieved much of the pressure to which the terrorists had been subjected in the past. In relative terms this meant that before the imposition of this new military strategy, if a soldier spotted a suspect who fled when called upon to halt, the soldier could pursue the subject, even into the sanctuary of a house or bar. But low profile meant that the patrol could no longer pursue a suspect. This was extremely frustrating for the security forces, especially since months of diligent intelligence work could be destroyed in this manner.

The breathing space afforded the terrorists was a net loss in intelligence gathering to the army. In 1977,


the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, acknowledged that, "Intelligence gathered by the army has been of great value in bringing terrorists before the courts." However, overt operations virtually ceased while covert intelligence became increasingly hazardous to acquire. When new recruits joined the IRA there were no records on them and when the conflict intensified, security forces in many cases did not know who the gunmen were. This lack of information led to costly delays and resulted in military and civilian casualties.

A notable source of inefficiency in security as well as intelligence operations in Northern Ireland is the rivalry between the police and the army. The British army's relationship with the Royal Ulster Constabulary has not always been easy. Until 1971, the army had been denied open access to available police intelligence and the use of their facilities. The army found itself being used increasingly as an armed police force in support of a civil agency rather than in an offensive role. The RUC wanted to subjugate the army in its security role and expressed doubt as to the army's ability to manage the counterinsurgency effort. During 1979 the Secretary for Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, supported the RUC's desire to play the central role in security operations in the embattled area. The immediate result was to prohibit the army from conducting house searches without RUC consent. While the army continued to collect intelligence, most of the collating was done by the RUC. The obvious solution to the relief of tensions between these allies in their common crusade must be a close liaison with all security services in matters of intelligence. Access to the very latest technologies in intelligence gathering and communication and surveillance is essential. An important need is for centralized intelligence data computerization which can provide information swiftly to security forces. The military does have

a valid role to play, but not at the exclusion of the police. The extent and nature of their mission should be determined by the particular situation.

Many terrorist groups, including the IRA, have international links, and the problem of combating terrorism must occupy international rather than just national concern. Contemporary terrorism has had an increasingly international dimension. A properly synchronized program of international and national measures is clearly required if these organizations are to be countered effectively. International attempts to deal with the problems of terrorism date back to 1937 when the League of Nations sponsored two conventions on this subject. Since that time individual states in the European community have actively participated in programs and individual measures to counteract terrorism, among which have been improving intelligence services, various screening processes using computer technology, police cooperation, and the exchange of information at an international level.

Intelligence cooperation has generally progressed at a more rapid pace than political and judicial cooperation. This effort has taken place at five different levels. Interpol, while confined under strict codes to deal with ordinary criminal activity, has been of some value in acting as a clearing house for information. NATO has developed a system for the exchange of intelligence data which includes information on terrorist weapons, personnel and tactics, and photographic as well as reconnaissance intelligence. Interagency training visits and personnel exchanges are now well established programs among the Common Market and NATO countries. Bilateral cooperation has been provided on an ad hoc basis at the request of governments. For instance, British SAS personnel, tactics, and weapons have been made available to support special Dutch and West German operations units. The West German computer data bank



on terrorists has been used to assist Italian authorities in their counterterrorist operations. The Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation in response to the increase in terrorist incidents and, conversely, the need for information, expanded its computerized intelligence capabilities between 1975 and 1977. This computer offers millions of pages of data which are catalogued and cross-referenced for instant recall and provides almost immediate access to valuable information which might otherwise take weeks to research. A similar system has since been installed and used by the police and British army in Northern Ireland.

There are no simple solutions to the terrorist problem in Ulster. Because of the unremitting efforts of the British security forces, terrorism has failed to gain a firm hold over the population; however, security within the terrorist organizations has been getting tighter and the networks harder to penetrate.

Preventive measures not only call for cooperation between the police and the military, but appropriate political initiatives must be available as well, including the employment of modern technology. The military will inevitably be involved for the foreseeable future, but as the RUC continues to exhibit greater confidence, the range of tasks for the army will diminish. The use of special operations forces such as the Special Air Service will continue, especially if the conflict becomes international in scope, which in the absence of appropriate measures, seems possible. The way forward will be achieved by a police force of adequate size, properly trained and equipped, along with an essential ingredient—an effective, efficient, well-regulated intelligence capability.

There is room for improvement in the fight against terrorism, both in Northern Ireland and internationally. Major General Lansdale, a prominent expert on unconventional warfare, states, "We live in a revolutionary era. My hunch is that history is waiting to

play a terrible joke on us. It did so recently on graduates of the Imperial Defense College in London, who now find themselves facing the savagery of revolutionary warfare in Northern Ireland. The advocates of making 'politics out of a gun barrel' are learning how to defeat us." He warns, "The point is that our future opponent is getting ready in a hard, realistic school, learning the rules of combat vastly different from those that are being taught in our war colleges. He has many recent examples to assure him that the rules he is learning will succeed over the rules that our professionals are being taught." There seems to be a clear message in his statement of caution and, hence, a valid requirement to mold our military as well as civil police training programs to include methods of coping with and countering terrorism.

Police in Western democracies have learned many valuable lessons from their recent experiences with terrorism. There have been three trends in this development. Significant improvements have been made in the techniques of intelligence gathering, infiltration and surveillance and in data computerization, but these moves have been slow in coming. At the national level, the machinery for the coordination of anti-terrorist operations has been improved. And thirdly, there have been greater international cooperation and exchange of data concerning international terrorism on a regular basis.

How well international terrorism will be countered in the future depends mainly on government policies, the effectiveness of security forces, the degree of international cooperation and the quality of intelligence.

Although terrorism cannot always be prevented, theoretically, it can be defeated. The dilemma is whether or not to pay the price of defeating it, and the issue is one of global survival. ★

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
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Crossword Puzzle

MILITARY HISTORY III

by Capt. Rudolph N. Garcia



ACROSS CLUES

3. SOVIET ARMOR THEORITICIAN OF THE 1920'S AND 30'S.
4. GERMAN ARTIST OF THE 15TH/16TH CENTURY WHO WROTE THE THEORY OF FORTIFICATIONS.
5. BRITISH GENERAL WHO WROTE "THE THIRD WORLD WAR."
6. U.S. COMMODORE WHO SAID "WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND THEY ARE OURS."
9. HIS FORCES TOOK CONSTANTINOPLE (ISTANBUL) IN 1453 A.D.
11. PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1642-1651.
12. IN 1898, HE LED A CAV TROOP IN THE LAST TRADITIONAL CAVALRY CHARGE IN MILITARY HISTORY.
13. KING AND LEADER OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.
15. AFTER SHOOTING DOWN 5 AIRPLANES, A FIGHTER PILOT BECOMES AN ---.
19. MARQUIS WHOSE FRENCH TROOPS HELPED U.S. IN REVOLUTIONARY WAR.
20. NAME FOR THE BEST, OVERALL, MEDIUM TANK IN THE WORLD FROM 1943-1955.
23. ----- THE LIONHEARTED HELPED DEFEAT THE MOSLEMS AT ACRE, 1191 A.D.
24. HE ESTABLISHED THE FIRST MILITARY ACADEMY OF MODERN TIMES IN 1617.
25. ON THE FIRST DAY OF THIS WWI BATTLE, THE BRITISH ARMY LOST 60,000 MEN.
26. THE ASSASSINATION OF THIS ARCHDUKE PRECIPITATED WWI.

DOWN CLUES

1. STONEWALL -----.
2. NAME OF THE FIRST MODERN BATTLESHIP, LAUNCHED ON 10 FEB 1906.
5. HE WAS BROUGHT OUT OF RETIREMENT TO FIGHT IN WWI AND WON THE BATTLE OF TANNENBERG, 1914.
7. IN WWII, HE DESTROYED AN ENTIRE SOVIET ARMORED BDE WITH A DUAL 30-MM CANNON, STUKA DIVE BOMBER.
8. THIS CARDINAL IS CONSIDERED THE 17TH CENTURY STRATEGIC GENIUS OF FRANCE.
10. HERO OF THE 3 MUSKETEERS AND 17TH CENTURY FIELD MARSHAL OF FRANCE.
13. THIS EX-RHETORIC/LANGUAGE PROF. WON MEDAL OF HONOR AT GETTYSBURG FOR ACTION AT LITTLE ROUND TOP.
14. THIS MEDIEVAL BATTLE IN 1346 MARKED THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE INFANTRY ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
16. NAME FOR A SERIES OF WWII SOVIET FIGHTER AND FIGHTER BOMBERS.
17. SURRENDERED TO GENERAL GRANT AT VICKSBURG.
18. ILLITERATE MONGOL WHOSE FORCES CONQUERED EVERY MAJOR REGION OF THE KNOWN WORLD EXCEPT W.EUROPE.
21. THE LARGEST TANK BATTLE OF WWII.
22. THIS AMERICAN GENERAL'S TROOPS TOOK MEXICO CITY IN 1847.



DESERT FORGE '85

Elements of the 513th Military Intelligence Group returned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, November 1 to conduct FTX Desert Forge '85. Tasked to provide echelons above corps intelligence support and electronic warfare support to the Third U.S. Army, the 513th exercise was designed to examine and refine deployment procedures, simulate operations in the desert environment, and test sustainment of operations in the later stages of a high intensity conflict. The exercise also provided interaction between personnel from USAICS and the 513th—a mutually beneficial learning experience.

Four hundred and fifty-three members of the 513th participated as players and controllers. Additional controllers were provided from the Third U.S. Army, the Intelligence and Security Command, the 377th Theater Area Army Command, and USAICS.

One of the more unusual aspects of the FTX was that the scenario and intelligence systems were manually driven by the exercise control group. No computer-assisted simulations were used.

Objectives of the FTX included conducting a major deployment/redeployment; training the group headquarters staff and subordinate units

and staffs in EAC ISEW operations in support of Commander, U.S. Army Central Command; and refining C³ procedures between the group headquarters and subordinate units. Other objectives were to examine and refine group organization techniques and procedures to support COMUSARCENT in combating enemy front, second echelon and reserve forces; refine personnel accountability, replacement systems, strength reporting and casualty reporting; refine logistic staff coordination; refine intelligence production at EAC, integrating all source material and special intelligence requirements; and examine EAC rear area security/protection functions and responsibilities.

The first phase of the operation, from October 9 to October 31, consisted of pre-exercise message traffic and predeployment preparation. The next phase, on November 1, involved actual deployment of units from locations throughout the United States to exercise sites at Fort Huachuca. From November 1 through November 4, FTX Alpha simulated the 513th MI Group's initial establishment of operations and deployment of assets in the area of operations.

The final phase, from November 5 on, consisted of interaction between the 513th and USAICS. Activities ranged from systems briefings by personnel in the Center and School, to OPFOR weapons/equipment displays and selected weapon firings managed by members of the 513th. USAICS students received briefings and observed operations in the joint interrogation facility, operated by the 202nd MI Battalion; the mobile operational unit system (experimental), operated by the 166th MI Company, 201st MI Battalion; CEFIRM LEADER, operated by the 138th Aviation Company, a reserve unit affiliated with the 201st MI Battalion; and a captured material exploitation center, operated by the 203rd MI Battalion.

The 513th Intelligence Center deployed and established the EAC intelligence center at Fort Huachuca. The EACIC performed and refined its intelligence collection management, processing, analysis, production reporting (dissemination), fusion and integration of operations at EAC in support of COMUSARCENT. ★

Photos by 1st Lt. Kevin R. Austra and Sp5 Robert A. Kerr

Units participating in Desert Forge '85:

HQ, 513th MI Group

513th MI Group Intelligence Center

HQ, 201st MI Battalion

17th MI Company (Imagery Interpretation)

166th MI Company (Ground SIGINT HF/DF)

138th Aviation Company (Air SIGINT/EW) (USAR)

HQ, 202nd MI Battalion

164th MI Company (Operations Security)

219th MI Company (Interrogation Prisoner of War)

HQ, 203rd MI Battalion

11th MI Company (Technical Intelligence)

364th MI Company (Technical Intelligence) (USAR)




The field headquarters of the 513th MI Group.



1st Sgt. Van R. Wilson (second from right) briefs team leaders.

National Liberation Front English Language Propaganda

By Captain John P. Seawell



The National Liberation Front's (NLF) concern for the ideological struggle has always been evident in operations in South Vietnam. The agitation and propaganda (agit-prop) teams have been referred to as the "basic cutting tools of the NLF." These teams, as they travelled through the villages of an area, stopping to entertain and provide political

"In a sense it is false and misleading to treat the NLF's communication effort as a separate entity. In truth, almost every act of the NLF was conceived as an act of communication. Its victories and defeats were essentially the result of successful or unsuccessful communications efforts." DOUGLAS PIKE (Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966.)

messages, represented a basic NLF assumption: the personal intermediary is the most potent form of communication. The NLF's major emphasis has been placed on indoctrination of the uncommitted indigenous population and continual agitation of its followers. The opportunities to influence the thinking of its enemies were also considered, however, this commu-

cation area does not lend itself to use of the personal intermediary.

During the height of American involvement, the NLF effort in English language propaganda was regular and prolific. Few American bases of company size or larger were free from some sort of leaflet distribution, and few patrols operating in 'unpopulated' areas for more than a day returned without copious samples of the NLF's printed English language material.

The use of propaganda is not new to the thinking of the Vietnamese Communists. In fact, one of the Vietminh's five principles of tactics was to "undermine enemy morale in every way possible." Documents captured during US troop presences referred to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong as "troops of propaganda and liberation."

The staple product of the NLF English language propaganda effort was the one-page leaflet. In most cases, the leaflet was printed on both sides, and ranged in size from 2" x 4" to 8" x 10", with the larger size rarely being used. One side of the leaflet normally carried the English language message, while the Vietnamese translation was printed on the other side. Reproduction was by mimeograph or letterpress, and although in a few cases, photographs and illustrations were used, there was generally little use of more than type illustrations.

Other material produced for American consumption included a multi-page newsletter, safe conduct passes, appeals from American soldiers in NLF hands and special purpose publications.

The more technically sophisticated items (four page brochures, items with photographs, etc.) were printed in North Vietnam Army base camps and carried into South Vietnam by military troops or political couriers. Printing presses were to be found somewhere underground (often literally) in most of the NLF province organizations in South Vietnam. In some cases, the copy for province-produced propaganda was original, but generally the themes, if not the wording itself, were taken from items produced at a higher level. At district level, the NLF organization sometimes had access to a typewriter and a mimeograph machine. Some district cadre were quite prolific in their mimeograph production, but few attempts at original work were made, and those few attempts were normally linguistic disasters. The requisite language skill for such an operation was not present.

Distribution was accomplished principally by NVA units and low-level support agents.

Primacy was determined by the characteristics of the area. In unpopulated areas where US troops frequently operated but had few fixed bases, NVA soldiers would be used exclusively. Around US base camps in populated areas, inconspicuous NLF agents who lived in the area would be used.

Ironically, the most sophisticated items reached US soldiers in the unpopulated areas. North Vietnamese Army units were closer to higher NLF headquarters, and the more



'advanced' items were likely to be carried by them, to be left in areas which were remote to all Americans except infantry troops.

Obviously, not all the material reached its intended audience. Much was lost to weather conditions, especially during the rainy season, and some was simply never found. The bulk of the loss — especially that carried by North Vietnamese soldiers — came as the result of contact with US troops. It was a common event to receive bullet-ridden propaganda samples taken from the bodies of North Vietnamese soldiers. The danger to the civilian low-level agent in passing propaganda was much less. He was a resident of the area concerned and could usually find some seemingly legitimate reason

Once again, in recognition of the tenth anniversary of Military Intelligence magazine, we reprint an article from our first year. This is the final installment in a three-part series. The staff of Military Intelligence hopes you will enjoy a look back at English language propaganda operations in South Vietnam, and have enjoyed our other reprints from ten years ago.


The Editor

Tenth Anniversary

1974-1984

MI Magazine

October-November-December 1974



USASATEC
The EW Link
between R/D
and the
Real World

for being around a US base. If caught with a small number of leaflets, he could protest that he collected them for starting fires, or use as toilet paper, as indeed, many uninvolved Vietnamese did.

THEMES

Fear was by far the most frequently used theme. Almost every leaflet carried at least one mention of "danger" or "death".

The United States' "weakness" emerged as the second most used theme, with references to the bombing halt and Vietnamization as signs of weakness or defeat and general references to the failure of the American war effort.

"Let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs" was another common theme, ranking third in overall usage. The material characterized the war as an internal struggle and sometimes drew parallels between it and the American Revolutionary and Civil Wars.

The hardships of family separation followed as the fourth most widely used theme. The emphasis was on the suffering of relatives at home rather than the suffering of soldiers in Vietnam.

The "injustice" of America's "aggressive war" in Vietnam followed as the sixth most often used theme.

A related theme, the damage of the war to American "honor" and "prestige" followed as the seventh most widely used theme.

Focus on American public opinion against the war, blame of the war on US leadership and on "capitalists," and characterization of the Vietnamese war as a "struggle for independence and freedom" were tied for eighth place frequency of usage.

The overall NLF effort appeared to suffer from Pike's "standard Communist communication weaknesses" (obtusity, formality, irrelevancy, and ultraconformity), particularly in the action advocated. Although pragmatism dominated the majority of the themes used, with appeal of personal, immediate impact rather than abstract, ideological appeals appearing most often, there was an almost-even split between the practical and the abstract in actions advocated.

ADVOCATED ACTIONS

The most frequently cited action was a pragmatic one: "Refuse to go on military operations." This appeal was often tied with the fear (danger and death) theme.

The second most used appeal was a rather nebulous "Demand troop withdrawal," followed in frequency of usage by an equally abstract, "Oppose the war."


The total number of references to these two appeals almost equals those in all other appeals combined. Other frequently advocated actions were mainly practical: "Don't fight/kill Vietnamese"; "Desert"; "Allow yourself to be captured."

The lack of success that the propaganda effort had is not surprising. On the practical level, the NLF had little to offer the American GI. There was little motivation to desert "in order to get home" when the tour of duty was only a year, and the road home through the NLF promised to be long and difficult at best. The promise of "safety" for the line-crosser meant little in an environment where American and South Vietnamese military power offered little safety for the belligerent, let alone the defector.

Ideologically, frequent references to "greedy capitalists," "gun dealers," "running dogs," and "rotten puppets" were not particularly attuned to the members of a modern industrial society.

Although the NLF English language propaganda effort did not produce "successes" which

can be measured here, there can be little doubt that the copious, regular appearance of leaflets did have some psychological effect on the American soldier target.




Interrogations and captured documents point to a more important effect of the propaganda effort — psychological benefit to the disseminator. In a conflict where the guerrilla fighter and NLF cadre had to maintain a passive role for so much of the time, the dissemination of leaflets served as one overt way to do something to the enemy — to make a personal, tangible contribution to the cause.

Countless captured documents referred to the propaganda effort against Americans as extremely important, and many assessed it as

highly effective, believing that it had resulted in thousands of desertions and surrenders. Often individual soldiers carried as much as twenty pounds of propaganda material (in addition to their weapons and rations) through dense jungle country for weeks in order to distribute it in American troop areas.

In diligently carrying out this job, which could rarely be supervised, the soldier and agent thought they were doing something of great import. Regardless of the real effect on American soldiers, the effort was worthwhile to the NLF in terms of morale. Perhaps this explains why virtually every leaflet, even those with highly specialized appeals (such as those aimed at Negro soldiers) were translated into Vietnamese.

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United States "crimes against the Vietnamese people" received almost as much attention as family separation. It is interesting to note that this theme was widely used before My Lai and other "war crime" allegations had come to the attention of the American public or the American soldier in Vietnam.

Killing of civilians was the most frequently alleged crime, and — perhaps because the target audience was ground troops — there was little reference to civilian deaths due to bombing or air strikes.

Intelligence Training Army Area Schools

The Intelligence Training Army Area Schools (ITAAS)—taught for reservist by reservist—offer reserve MI personnel MOS and non-MOS intelligence training. The trainees include individuals anticipating assignment to, or already on the job as, troop unit S2's or G2's, or those working within an intelligence section.

The courses offered at each of the three ITAAS's vary, but may include officer courses, such as Tactical Intelligence

Staff Officer (TISO) (MOS 9301), Counterintelligence Officer (MOS 9666), and Aerial Surveillance Officer (MOS 9309). Typical Warrant Officer courses are CI Technician (MOS 971A), and Prisoner of War Technician (MOS 963A). Enlisted courses include Intelligence Analyst (MOS 96B), Interrogator (MOS 96C), and CI Agent (MOS 97B).

Each ITAAS instructional program supported by the USA

Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) closely parallels the USAICS resident course, but is phased in two-week increments. A reservist whose civilian job permits only two weeks a year for this type of training may spend three years completing the six-week TISO course, while another reservist with more time may complete the same course in one summer.

For additional information about any of the ITAAS, address your specific questions to:

Commander, First Army, ATTN: AFKS-01-11, Fort Meade, MD 20755
Commander, Fifth Army, ATTN: AFK8015, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234
Commander, Sixth Army, ATTN: AFK01-15, Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129



**The
Patty Hearst
trial was
drenched in
Stockholm Syndrome
defenses.**

by SSgt. Richard L. Stanley

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE *Stockholm*

Between 1968 and 1979 there were a total of 3,336 reported terrorist incidents, involving both criminal and political motives. Four hundred and fifty of these incidents took place within the United States. Breaking these statistics down even further, approximately one third of these terrorist incidents included hostage taking. Hostage taking appeared to have peaked from 1974 through 1977 according to a CIA Research Study (PR 76 10030 April 77).

Negotiations with the hostage taker on the part of security and law enforcement personnel are paramount in attempting to effect the release of hostages. A unique phenomenon was discovered among hostages who had been held for extended periods. Known as the Stockholm Syndrome, this phenomenon occurs as an automatic and unconscious, emotional response (bonding) to the trauma of being a hostage. This syndrome has been identified around the world and includes a high level of stress as participants are cast together in a life-threatening situation where each must achieve new levels of adaptation just to stay alive.

The Stockholm Syndrome affects both the hostage and the hostage taker alike. Apparently, women are more susceptible than men, and young women are more susceptible than older women. Hostage negotiators themselves are not immune to this phenomenon. This positive emotional bond, developed in, or perhaps because of, the stress of the siege environment, serves to unite its victims and the terrorists in a common mental attitude against outsiders. This philosophy of *us against them* seems to be beyond the control of the victims and the subject.

Three phases of the Stockholm Syndrome experience were described by Dr. Frank M. Ochberg, Acting Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, during interviews with FBI analysts in November 1978. Within the three phases are the positive feelings of the captives toward their captors that are accompanied by negative feelings toward the police-rescuers. These feelings are frequently reciprocated by the captors. To achieve a successful resolution of the hostage situation, law enforcement personnel, especially negotiators, must encourage and tolerate the first two phases so as to induce the third and thus preserve the lives of all participants.

The Stockholm Syndrome was named after a particular hostage incident which took place in a Stockholm, Sweden, credit bank from 10:15 a.m. on August 23, to 9 p.m. on August 28, 1973. The incident stemmed from an aborted bank robbery. During the 131 hours of close confinement (within the bank vault) the hostages and hostage takers conversed freely and discussed their lives, thoughts and feelings in depth. Both hostage takers and hostages feared death from a potential police assault. As time passed rapport was established between the hostages, three young women and one young man, and the hostage takers, a 32-year-old escaped convict and his friend, whom he demanded be released from jail early in the negotiations.

At one point one of the women denounced the police response, siding with the hostage takers, saying that *they were the victims of a sick society*. The hostages frequently spoke in terms of *us* and *we* when talking of their group of hostages and captors.

Upon surrender of the would-be bank robbers, the women shielded the robbers with their own bodies to protect them from the police. Further, the women embraced the criminals and spoke of seeing them again soon while the police escorted them away. One of the hostages was confused as to why she still desired to see her former captors over a year after the incident. Victims of Stockholm Syndrome may remain hostile toward the police indefinitely. The original victims of the incident have visited their abductors frequently, and one former hostage became engaged to one of the criminals. Such actions are not unique and have also been identified in the United States as well as in other countries.

The Patty Hearst trial was drenched in Stockholm Syndrome defenses. Hearst had been kidnapped under extreme fear of violence by members of the Symbionese Liberation Army. The SLA was commanded by an ex-stoolie for the Los Angeles Police and staffed by, what has been described as, a group of confused college girls with emotional problems. As members and leaders of an organization with a cause, these young women suddenly had feelings of belonging and being accepted. After living with her captors for several months, Hearst came to strongly identify with them and their cause, and eventually became a totally willing SLA soldier/terrorist.

Hostage negotiators need to be aware of this survival identification phenomenon. They must understand how it develops and be able to read the signs, while at the same time anticipate its presence in the hostages, the hostage takers and, eventually, even in themselves. They must use this knowledge advantageously

Syndrome

for the safety, and ultimately the safe release, of the hostages. The hostage taker may attempt to mentally block the fact that the hostages are human beings with families, jobs, illnesses and feelings. As time passes, if hostages and hostage takers are free to openly communicate with one another, that mental block is eroded. The hostage taker actually begins to see the hostages as individuals, thus finding it more and more difficult to treat them as objects rather than people, more difficult to harm them than it had seemed initially, thus contributing substantially to the safety of the hostages.

On the other side of the coin, the hostages may also be more able to identify with their captors. Thus, they may be more willing and able prisoners, perhaps even to the extent that they may actually protect the hostage taker, such as shielding the hostage taker's body from police or assisting in plans for mutual escape. (Few hostage takers realize that this phenomenon is occurring. However, in cases such as the Mogadishu and Entebbe plane hijackings, the terrorists consciously treated hostages harshly and kept them at a distance to preclude the Stockholm Syndrome from developing.)

The fear of death is greatest during the initial stages of captivity in a hostage environment. As the fear of death subsides, the victim reasons that he owes his life to the captors, who have in turn allowed him to live a while longer. The captor holds the hostage's life on a thread of hope. The fear of the police begins to set in because it is thought a police assault is more likely, and thus police actions seem to pose more of a danger than the hostage taker's actions.

The hostage negotiator must also be aware of the potential development of the Stockholm Syndrome in himself during dealings with the hostage takers. Extended periods devoted to negotiations can cause the negotiator to identify with the criminal, thus blinding him to his primary mission of protecting the hostages and effecting their eventual release. A former negotiator describes the psychological effects of Stockholm Syndrome during his attempt to obtain the safe release of hostages being held by a lone gunman. He had negotiated with the hostage taker for over 30 hours, and once all the hostages had been released he began to plead frantically with the police snipers to spare the life of the criminal, fearing that the police *were there for blood*. The negotiator repeatedly begged the hostage taker to lay down his weapons and come out from his fortified position so that he could be spared. Finally the criminal emerged with weapon in hand. This action was identified as a threatening act, at which time the criminal was instantly and fatally shot by police snipers. It was a traumatic experience for the negotiator and for several months he blamed himself for the death, believing that if he had communicated in a different manner, he may have been able to save the hostage taker's life.

Apparently, hostage negotiators cannot escape the effects of this mental bonding process. This is partly due to the process used in selecting negotiators. They are chosen for the ability to relate to others, their education and nationality, any racial interaction experience and other background profiles. A trained hostage negotiator of oriental descent would be more likely to establish rapport

with an oriental hostage taker than would an equally-trained negotiator of French-Canadian extraction.

Due to their compatible backgrounds, hostage taker and hostage negotiator are likely to identify with one another, as is desired. This, in some cases, leads to effects comparable to that identified in Stockholm Syndrome victims. This susceptibility could be lessened by rotating negotiators from time to time; however, this practice could prove detrimental to previously established rapport and additionally harden the distrust of hostage takers. The risk the negotiator takes is quite similar to risks taken by anyone who could *fail*. Thus, perhaps, postcrisis deprogramming of negotiators should be included in the plans of all such operations.

Unfortunately, as noted earlier, the hostage incident may not end with the safe release of the hostages. Just as the original Stockholm Syndrome victims have visited their abductors, some American victims visit their captors in prisons around the country. Some victims have begun defense funds for them, while others have married their former abductors. A hostile hostage is a price that law enforcement must anticipate paying for a living hostage. However, a human life is an irreplaceable treasure and worth some hostility. A poor or hostile witness for the prosecution is a small price to pay for his life. ★

SSgt. Richard L. Stanley is a platoon sergeant with the 511th Military Police Company at Fort Dix, N.J. He has served in a variety of MP, intelligence and security positions during his 12 years of service. Stanley has an alternate MOS in intelligence analysis.

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***Terrorists
who seek worldwide
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by barricading themselves
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now must also contemplate
being shot.***

The April 1983 bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in which 57 people were killed, like the bombing of the French embassy a year earlier in which 14 people died, represent both the success and the dilemma of those charged with security against terrorists. In the 1970s, seizing embassies and kidnapping diplomats were common terrorist tactics. With better security and growing resistance to meeting terrorist demands, embassy takeovers declined but assassinations and bombings increased. Overall, attacks on diplomats went up.

The dilemma is that terrorists can attack anything while governments cannot protect every conceivable target against every possible kind of

REFLECTIONS

ON RECENT TRENDS IN TERRORISM

by Brian Michael Jenkins

attack. If embassies cannot be seized, embassies can be blown up. And if terrorists cannot blow up embassies they can blow up railroad stations, hotel lobbies, restaurants, or Horse Guard parades. The dilemma of security officials is part of a larger problem confronting those who must deal with terrorism.

Despite increasing government success in combating terrorists, the total volume of terrorist activity worldwide has increased during the last 10 years. It is a paradox that frustrates governments and confounds analysts.

Governments have become tougher in dealing with terrorists. More and more governments have adopted hard-line, no concessions, no negotiations policies—a marked change from the situation in the early 1970s when governments often gave in to the demands of terrorists holding hostages. Terrorists who seize embassies, a popular tactic in the 1970s, now face arrest and prosecution.

They also risk being killed as more and more governments have demonstrated their willingness to use force whenever possible to end hostage episodes at home and abroad. When Arab separatists seized the Iranian Embassy in London in April 1980, the British government refused to meet any of their demands and later sent in Special Air Service commandos to rescue the hostages. All but one of the terrorists were killed in the assault. Terrorists who seek worldwide publicity and political concessions by barricading themselves with hostages now must also contemplate being shot.

Governments sometimes still make secret deals with international terrorist groups, offering freedom of movement in return for immunity from attack; but with some exceptions, governments appear less inclined to "parole" imprisoned foreign terrorists simply to avoid further attacks.

At the technical level, governments have become more proficient in combating terrorism. They have skillfully used offers of reduced sentences, conditional pardons, new identities to key witnesses and other inducements to persuade at least some terrorists to provide information about their organizations. Italy has been particularly successful in exploiting so-called "repentants," as they call apprehended terrorists who have taken advantage of a new law providing reduced sentences in return for information. The willingness of captured Red Brigade members to talk was one of the key factors in the rescue of General Dozier in 1982. The collection and analysis of intelligence have improved and international cooperation has increased.

***Nowhere,
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long-range goals.***

Physical security around likely terrorist targets also has greatly increased. It is harder now, though still possible, to smuggle weapons aboard airliners. Embassies have become fortresses. Diplomats and top executives often travel in armored limousines with armed bodyguards. Specialized tactics and skills have been developed for use in hostage situations.

Worldwide, thousands of terrorists have been arrested or compelled to go deeper underground. Some groups have been virtually destroyed. Others are hard-pressed by authorities.

Most of the Red Brigades now reside in prison. German police captured the operational heads of the Red Army Faction in December of 1982. Eleven members of the FALN, a Puerto Rican separatist group, were apprehended in Illinois four years ago. One of the most wanted Puerto Rican separatist bombers was recently captured in Mexico.

But despite these undeniable achievements, the total volume of terrorist activity in the world has not diminished. Like the Hydra—the mythical many-headed monster that grew two heads each time one was severed—terrorism persists, even grows, despite defeats. Authorities are able to suppress terrorists temporarily, but thus far have been unable to easily reduce terrorism, without resorting to unacceptable methods of repression.

Old groups survive. New groups appear. They are generally smaller, more tightly organized at the operational level and harder to penetrate, sometimes less structured at the national level and harder to predict, always more violent.

Exact figures vary according to the source of information, collection criteria and procedures, but the trajectory of terrorism continues upward. While in some countries terrorist activity has declined, it has increased in others. At a time when terrorism declined sharply in Italy it exploded in France. The number of terrorist incidents in Israel dropped sharply after Israel's invasion of Lebanon, but the number of terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad went up.

Governments may be able—and more willing—to pursue local terrorists than those who cross borders to carry out their attacks or who attack targets connected with foreign governments. Counting local and international terrorism together, we see a slight decline in the total number of incidents since 1980 but a 13 percent annual increase in the number of deaths caused by terrorists. Looking at international terrorism by itself, the picture is worse. The first three years of the 1980s showed an annual increase in international terrorism of approximately 30 percent—twice the rate of increase in the 1970s. Overall, terrorist activity has increased fourfold in the decade since the Munich incident.

This is not to say that terrorism has been a success. Nowhere, this side of the colonial era, have terrorists yet achieved their own stated long-range goals. No doubt terrorism did contribute to the success of colonial insurgents a generation ago. Certainly terrorist tactics figured prominently in the struggles for independence in Israel, Cyprus, Algeria, and Kenya, and after lengthy and debilitating military contests like those in Indonesia, Indochina and Algeria, colonial governments appeared almost eager to abandon distant possessions which had become costly anyway. Flags came down at the first whiff of cordite. But the stakes are higher at home. Governments are not so willing to separate what is regarded as national territory—Northern Ireland, the Basque Provinces, Brittany or Corsica—even if it means a fight. Nor will they yield before the onslaught of ideologically-motivated terrorists on the left or right.

Terrorists are able to attract publicity to themselves and their causes. They produce worldwide alarm. They

create crises that governments are compelled to deal with. They make governments and corporations divert vast resources to security measures. Occasionally they win concessions. In several instances they have provoked the overthrow of governments, usually by elements willing to use repressive tactics with less constraint. Some terrorists see this last achievement as an intermediate objective in their struggle to seize power; repression is supposed to arouse the masses to join the resistance. Historically, however, such Pyrrhic victories have been preludes to the terrorists' own destruction. In Uruguay, Argentina and Turkey, rising levels of terrorist violence provoked military takeovers that led to harsh crackdowns, which local terrorists did not survive.

Terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains. Nor have they yet revealed a convincingly workable strategy that relates terrorist violence to positive political power. In that sense terrorism has failed. It is a fundamental failure, ironically one recognized by early Marxist revolutionaries.

The paradox works on both sides. Despite their failure, terrorists persist in their struggles. Why? Are terrorists irrational or simply slow learners? Probably neither, but they are capable of self delusion. Professor Franco Ferracuti, a noted psychiatrist who has studied Italy's terrorists, suggests that terrorists wage fantasy wars. The presumption of war permits violence that would otherwise be unacceptable. It is, however, fantasy because the rest of society does not share the presumption.

In fact, cut off from most normal contacts with society, having only each other to talk to, terrorists live in a fantasy world. Their organizations are extravagant assertions. They imagine themselves to be armies and brigades. They believe themselves to have legions of supporters or potential supporters on whose behalf they claim to fight, but their constituencies, like their military formations, are largely imaginary.

Terrorists carry out operations they believe are likely to win widespread approval from these perceived constituents. But they do not always seem able to distinguish between a climate that is favorable to them

because of what they do and a climate that just happens to be favorable to them. Terrorists like the Weather Underground, who were active during the height of the Vietnam War protests, mistook anti-war sentiments for pro-revolutionary sentiments.

Terrorists fall prey to their own propaganda. They overestimate their own strength, their appeal, the weakness of their enemies, the imminence of victory. And they continue to fight, for to quit is not simply to admit defeat; it requires an admission of irrelevancy. It removes the justification for violence.

Some terrorists may be less concerned with progress toward distant goals, or the lack of it. It's not winning or losing, it's playing the game. They are action-oriented rather than goal-oriented. Terrorism becomes an end in itself for some, because living a dangerous life underground, oiling weapons, building bombs, endlessly planning and occasionally carrying out acts of violence fulfill some inner psychological need; for others perhaps because membership in a terrorist organization gives them status and offers them opportunities for the continued application of criminal skills which they have developed as terrorists.

This suggests another reason why terrorist groups go on. Terrorist groups are collections of persons with otherwise unsalable skills. They have membership, hierarchy, management, specialized functions, and a cash flow. Organizations are dedicated to survival. They do not voluntarily go out of business. Right now

***Terrorists
with too many scruples
drop out,
are removed,
or go along with
hard-liners
to maintain their position
of leadership.***

the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed terrorist groups is the same as the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed corporations, that is, to continue operations.

They may restructure themselves to do so. They may revise their goals. They may alter their operations. But they will struggle to stay in business. It is an organizational imperative.

In the process of long-term survival, some terrorist groups are changing their character. It costs a great deal of money to maintain a terrorist group. Terrorists who do not receive financial support from foreign patrons must earn it through bank robberies, ransom kidnappings, extortion, smuggling, or participation in the narcotics traffic, all of which require criminal skills. Gradually, the criminal activities in support of terrorism become ends in themselves as terrorist groups come to resemble ordinary criminal organizations with a thin political veneer.

If the world's major terrorist groups sank into common criminality, the problem of terrorism might diminish, but the lack of progress and the methods necessary to achieve it remain issues within the terrorist ranks. As in war when neither side prevails, there is a tendency toward escalation, and we see evidence of escalation in terrorism. At the beginning of the 1970s, 80 percent of terrorist operations were directed against things, 20 percent against people. By the 1980s, approximately half of all terrorist attacks were directed against people. Incidents with fatalities have

increased by roughly 20 percent a year. Large-scale indiscriminate attacks like the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut have become more common. In 1982, six terrorist bombings alone killed over 80 persons and injured more than 400. 1983 is likely to be known as the year of the car bomb; 5 car bombs killed 135 and injured nearly 600 persons. Civilian bystanders—those who just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time—increasingly are victims of terrorist operations, further evidence of growing indiscriminate violence.

There are several explanations why terrorism has grown bloodier. Terrorists have been brutalized by long struggles, the public numbed. Staying in the headlines, in a world in which incidents of terrorism have become increasingly common, and recovering the coercive power terrorists once exercised over governments which have since become more resistant require acts of greater violence. Terrorists also have become more proficient; they can now build bigger bombs. At the same time, the composition of terrorist groups has changed as harder men and women have replaced the older generations of terrorists who debated the morality and utility of actions against selected individuals.

Just how far terrorists will escalate remains a matter of debate within the inner circles of terrorist leaders and conjecture by outside observers. We could see more of the same with no great changes in tactics or targets, a continued ragged increase of terrorism as we know it today. Or we could see escalation in the form of increasing events of large scale violence. At the far edge of plausibility are the scenarios that fascinate newspapers and novelists in which terrorists acquire and use or threaten to use chemical or nuclear weapons to hold cities hostage. Almost every terrorist

group probably has contemplated the utility of violence on a larger scale. And, for the most part, they have rejected it. Unless we are talking about high technology terrorism, the constraints on terrorists are not technical but rather self-imposed and political.

If recent bombings in London, Paris, Beirut, and Pretoria are any indication, these constraints seem to be eroding. In hideouts of the Red Brigades, Italian police discovered a frightening terrorist plan to attack the Christian Democrat's political convention—an operation that if realized would have resulted in the deaths of dozens of people. Smarting from their defeat and withdrawal from Beirut, PLO chief Yasir Arafat reportedly is under pressure from hard-liners to abandon his current "moderate" course and permit the creation of a new Black September organization to wage a worldwide campaign of terrorism. The recent car bombing in Pretoria represents a new and likely to be bloodier phase in the struggle of African National Congress guerrillas against white rule in South Africa.

Occasionally intelligence sources, terrorist publications, or the testimony of defectors give us a glimmer of the arguments for and against such operations. The more moderate among the extremists argue that apart from being immoral, indiscriminate violence is counterproductive. It alienates perceived constituents (even if they are largely imaginary), causes public revulsion, provokes extreme countermeasures that the organization might not survive, and exposes the operation and the organization itself to betrayal by terrorists who have no stomach for slaughter. Harder men and women counter that wars (even fantasy wars) are won by the ruthless application of violence. Gradually the hard-liners prevail.

It is difficult to argue for constraint in an organization comprised of ex-

tremists who have already taken up arms, especially if things are not going well. Terrorists are by nature not easily disciplined. Terrorists with too many scruples drop out, are removed, or go along with hard-liners to maintain their position of leadership.

Governments grow tougher and more efficient. Terrorists persist and grow more savage. And terrorism increases.★

*Brian Michael Jenkins, Director of the Security and Subnational Conflict Program, The Rand Corporation, is a recognized authority on international terrorism and political violence. Before coming to Rand, Jenkins, a former Green Beret paratrooper, served in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention and later in Vietnam. He is the recipient of two Bronze Stars and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry for his military service in Vietnam. He later returned to Vietnam as a civilian in 1968. For his service on General Creighton Abrams' Long-Range Planning Task Group, Jenkins received the Outstanding Civilian Service Award. One of the first analysts to research international terrorism, he now leads a new research program focusing on political violence and subnational conflict. He is the author of **International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict** (1975), and is a co-author of **The Fall of South Vietnam** (1980). He is the editor of **Terrorism and Beyond** (1982), and **The Soft Target: Terrorism and Personal Security** (forthcoming). Jenkins has authored chapters in over a dozen books on political violence and has written numerous articles on the subject.*



Cryptocorner

by Walter B. Howe

SEARCHING THROUGH HISTORY

Hidden within this square are 43 famous battles throughout history. You are a true student of military if you can recover them from the given clues. You can get some more help by deciphering the battle list that follows the clues. The list is NOT in the same order as the clues. The letters left over after finding all the battles spell out a message to you. Good solving!

DATES AND CLUES:

- 332 Siege towers across the sea.
- 1066 (That's enough clue!)
- 1191 Saladin tries to break a siege.
- 1314 Robert the Bruce frees Scotland.
- 1415 The longbow triumphs.
- 1453 The Sultan besieges the Emperor.
- 1634 A 30-Years War battle.
- 1775 Shot heard around the world.
- 1778 Taking the offensive.
- 1781 The decisive defeat.
- 1805 Battle of the Three Emperors.
- 1807 Napoleon in deep snow.
- 1809 Last victory of the campaign.
- 1812 Near Moscow.
- 1813 Napoleon rebuilds successfully.
- 1815 Wellesley triumphs.
- 1847 Halls of Montezuma are next.
- 1854 Brits and French fight Russkis.
- 1854 Charge of the Light Brigade.
- 1855 Cry-me-a River.
- 1862 Bloody April.
- 1862 The Bloodiest Day.
- 1863 Hooker and Lee fight in May.
- 1863 Three days in Pennsylvania.
- 1863 The last victory.
- 1914 Openers: A Russian disaster.
- 1917 Austro-Hung., German offensive.
- 1917 First use of massed tanks.
- 1918 First large use of U.S. troops.
- 1941 Are airdrops too expensive?
- 1941 600,000 prisoners.
- 1941 Backs against the sea.
- 1942 6th Army destroyed.
- 1942 Tide turns with Fox away.
- 1944 Clark assaults Gustav line.
- 1944 Five months on the beach.
- 1944 While Patton diverts.
- 1944 Market Garden objective.
- 1944 The counteroffensive.
- 1945 The Bridgehead.
- 1954 A French lesson.
- 1973 Israeli S. takes offensive.
- 1976 Israeli raid shows how.

I	U	S	G	N	I	T	S	A	H	W	A	G	R	A	M	F	Y
T	S	H	I	L	O	H	G	R	U	B	S	Y	T	T	E	G	O
A	U	C	P	D	R	E	S	D	E	N	W	O	T	K	R	O	Y
N	N	R	A	N	E	A	N	R	U	B	K	C	O	N	N	A	B
N	E	G	A	M	E	R	C	A	S	S	I	N	O	S	D	M	E
E	G	L	U	B	B	I	T	E	B	B	E	T	N	E	D	R	L
N	N	A	A	E	H	R	B	I	P	R	R	S	W	V	A	A	L
B	I	N	I	L	T	H	A	N	O	E	Y	U	T	A	R	F	I
U	L	Z	L	L	A	O	A	I	E	V	T	O	K	S	G	E	V
R	D	I	N	E	U	M	I	G	N	I	T	L	G	T	N	S	S
G	R	O	O	A	S	U	E	P	U	R	D	B	U	O	I	E	R
A	O	N	R	U	T	N	B	I	U	A	E	A	S	P	L	N	O
H	N	O	M	W	E	O	W	O	N	Y	M	L	W	O	A	I	L
T	E	T	A	O	R	R	C	T	L	N	C	A	S	L	T	H	E
U	M	G	N	O	L	N	I	A	C	R	T	C	K	A	S	C	C
O	E	N	D	D	I	E	U	O	E	E	N	L	I	C	G	R	N
M	H	I	Y	G	T	A	T	T	R	H	U	A	E	R	I	L	A
N	N	X	A	A	Z	A	E	L	T	C	I	V	V	E	O	H	H
O	R	E	M	E	L	P	O	N	I	T	N	A	T	S	N	O	C
M	A	L	C	A	P	O	R	E	T	T	O	B	R	U	K	N	S

NOTE: The list of battles below is enciphered with a simple substitution system. Each of the 26 letters is consistently replaced by another letter. One battle is not listed, but appears in the encryption key, instead.

MVFJPWGZ PXCJP	FZOMXWYO	KXJW LXJW RFO
WSPKBXWYJW	LJBBJZQ NSSK	GSPDMSNW
VZOOXWS	WSPTZWKG	ZQOMJPBXMA
KPJOKJW	NZMJPBSS	PJTZYJW
LZWWSVDLQPW	NZYPZT	OJCZOMSRSB
TSWTSQMF	VFXVDZTZQYZ	LZBZVBZCZ
VJXWJOJ HXPT	VPJMJ	ZPWFJT
MSLPQD	JWMJLLJ	YJMMGOLOPY
LSPSKXWS	LQBYJ	ZWMXJMZT
OFXBSF	VSWOMZWMXWSRBJ	MZWWJWLQPY
BJIXWYMSW	VFZWVJBSPCXBBJ	DXJC
JB ZBTZJXW	ZVPJ	VZTLPZX
ZWAXS	JGBZQ	OMZBXWYPZK
VFZRQBMJRJV	VZRSPJMMS	MGPJ

solution on page 42

Terrorism Counteraction Bibliography

by Dr. Bruce D. Saunders
USAICS Historian

Many readers of *Military Intelligence* have expressed interest in reading information that is both relevant and available on topics covered in depth in the magazine. This brief bibliography was prepared with the guidance and assistance of Dr. Rudolph Levy of the Department of Human Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. It is intended to provide in-depth information for those readers who wish to increase their knowledge of terrorism/counteraction or improve their professional libraries on this subject. The designator listed after each citation is the current Library of Congress number that will assist in finding these items in your post or municipal library.

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USAICS Notes

Water Survival Training

by Billy R. Shepherd

Although Fort Huachuca isn't exactly known for its sandy beaches, a Water Survival Training Program has been developed here by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School.

The program, designed by 2nd Lt. Gregory W. Sanborn and MSgt. Robert M. Donahue of the 1st School Brigade Operations, is a mandatory training course for the school's soldiers. "Our short-range goal is to ensure all soldiers receive this training during their tour here," explained Sanborn. "We anticipate this program will be adopted Armywide.

The Water Survival Training Program is divided into four stations: first

aid, drownproofing stroke, expedient flotation devices and water survival.

The first aid portion includes training in artificial respiration, stopping bleeding and treating shock. "This reinforces the common tasks and soldiers skills each of us must do," Sanborn said.

Station two of the program is designed to teach soldiers a new drownproofing stroke. The concept is to teach soldiers to conserve energy and body heat while making some movement to safety. "The drownproofing stroke was an ROTC project of mine at the University of Hawaii," Sanborn said. "It took me four years,

but it really works well.

"The difference between this training and the drownproofing taught by the Army is that our drownproofing stroke will also move you through the water," he added.

The expedient flotation device training is similar to drownproofing taught by the Army now. Training includes using fatigue pants and shirts as flotation devices.

The final station of the Water Survival Training Program puts all the skills learned into a practical exercise. The soldiers are blindfolded to simulate a night environment prior to jumping into deep water with a weapon. Then, the soldiers must inflate an expedient flotation device (pants) while holding their weapons and float 25 meters to safety.

Donahue describes that exercise as a "confidence builder," but the "real confidence builder" he says is the optional training. "From the 10-foot board, wearing full uniform including LBE, rucksack and weapon,



2nd Lt. Gregory Sanborn, Intelligence Center and School, watches a student use an expedient flotation device (pants) during water survival training. (Photo by D.J. Posner)



we have them jump into the water wearing the LPU-10 (life vest)," he explained.

Sanborn and Donahue trained company-level instructors who are responsible for training their companies. Instruction for soldiers assigned to the Intelligence Center and School began in September.



2nd Lt. Gregory Sanborn checks equipment before one of his students jumps from diving board during water survival training conducted at the Intelligence Center and School. (Photo by D.J. Posner)



MSGT. Robert M. Donahue, Co. A, Intelligence Center and School, demonstrates optional training to soldiers attending the Water Survival Training Program. (Photo by D.J. Posner)

Project Saves Army \$77,000

by Billy R. Shepherd

The Training Support Company, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, has only been activated since April, but the TSC soldiers already have something to brag about. The first 37 soldiers assigned to the company saved the government \$77,000 by building their own compound.

"It was really good for our soldiers," said Capt. Brad T. Andrew, TSC commander. "It gave them unit identity and an accomplishment they could rally around."

According to Andrew, the compound was scheduled in the fiscal year 1985 budget. "They estimated that contract for the fence at \$25,000. We requested it be a self-help project in March," Andrew explained. "We

started work on the fence in the first week of July and completed it August 31."

The materials for the compound came from the Property Disposal Office. More than 850 feet of fence was acquired and used for the compound. The soldiers dug more than 120 post holes to erect the fence.

The project was dubbed "Project Lordship" and was headed by SFC David P. Equils. Equils said the project was a good learning experience for the soldiers. "I think they learned a lot about construction. Some people had never got their hands dirty before. And because most people have pride in what they do, I think they'll take better care of it," he said.


The TSC soldiers didn't stop with just the compound fence. They also found five trailers owned by the Air Force through the PDO yard.

"The soldiers went out to where the trailers were located, dug them out and moved them back here using tractors borrowed from the Intelligence and Security Board," Andrew claimed. "We did all the foundation and leveling ourselves."

The Air Force was going to destroy the trailers so TSC just signed for them. According to Andrew, not having to lease the trailers will save the government \$50,000 per year.


The TSC soldiers refurbished, painted, repaired roofs and sand-bagged the trailers in place in two

Members of the Training Support Company stand in front of one of five trailers they refurbished and painted while building the company's compound. (Photo by D.J. Posner)



For the hard work accomplished, the soldiers of TSC have built a memorial, a rock dug from the ground

"They built it with initiative, hard work and determination. They beat the odds and the obstacles."



This rock stands as a memorial for the soldiers who dug it up while putting up a fence that surrounds the company's compound. (Photo by D.J. Posner)

Training Field Manuals Due Out

FM 25-1, Training, covers the philosophy and principles of training. It is for leaders at all levels. FM 25-2, Unit Training Management, describes the Army training management process. It is for commanders at battalion level and above and their staffs. FM 25-3, Training in Units, provides the "how to" for the conduct of training. It is for first-line trainers at battalion level and below. FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, describes the conduct and use of training exercises to sustain skills. It is primarily for commanders and staffs at battalion level and above. These manuals are significant doctrinal contributions. Be sure to update your DA Form 12A (by checking block number 159, Techniques of Military Instruction), or write the U.S. Army Publications Center in Baltimore, Maryland, to obtain copies.

Officers' Notes

So You Want To Be Selected

by Lt. Col. Paul J. Tuohig
Chief, DA Secretariat

Every time a centralized Department of the Army selection board list is released, some officers rejoice, others commiserate. This will be true as long as there are fewer promotions, or school seats, or commands than there are qualified officers to fill them.

In the centralized selection process, the assignments you have had, your manner of performance, and the qualifications you possess are a matter of record—or are they? Remember, the only documents a selection board has to evaluate you are your Officer Record Brief, the performance portion of your Official Military Personnel File, and a copy of your official photograph. Have you checked recently to make sure these documents are accurate and complete?

The following tips will help you get ready for that next selection board and, at least, ease your mind that the board members are considering you as you really are.

Photograph: The official photograph in your file is used to add a degree of personality to your entire record. Board members often go to the photo first to see what you look like before delving into your performance record. That being the case, you must ensure that the photo they view is as complimentary as possible. No one will fault you for baldness, ugliness, flat feet or the like, but if your photo is seven years old and you look like you slept in your uniform, these will obviously impact on those all-critical members who vote your file. AR 640-30 contains information about how and when photographs need to be taken. Incidentally, all boards now receive the actual hard copy photo which is much clearer than the one on microfiche.

Officer Record Brief: Your ORB serves as a summary of where you've been and what you've done. It is an important document used in the decision-making process of board

members. While officers should review all items on the ORB for accuracy, you should pay particular attention to your specialties, date of rank, military and civilian education, height and weight data, awards and decorations, and your history of assignments. Work through your MILPO to change any erroneous or incomplete entries.

Official Military Personnel File: The "guts" of your record considered by a selection board consists of your OMPF on microfiche plus any paper documents received but not put on microfiche before the board convenes. Generally, the performance portion of your OMPF includes your evaluation reports, award orders, transcripts of grades, letters of commendation and appreciation, and records of any disciplinary action. You can't do much about these documents except to confirm that they are all there and that they all belong to you. Documents specifically authorized for filing are listed in Chapter 4, AR 640-10.

Letters to the Board: You have the option of writing a letter to the board to address any matter that you believe is important to your consideration for selection. Letters must arrive on or before the date the board convenes. Some officers misuse this opportunity and enclose third-party recommendations or write rambling autobiographies attesting to their superb qualifications for advancement. Most board members discount such letters as unhelpful, superfluous and unnecessary. Use common sense and good judgment if you choose to communicate with a board. Write a concise letter stating only the facts not apparent from the rest of your file, such as, "I have been enrolled in a part-time graduate program since 1981 and expect to receive my MBA from Tulsa Tech in December 1983."

What You Should Do:

1. At least four months before a board is scheduled to convene to

consider you, request a copy of your ORB and OMPF microfiche. Write to Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, VA 22332. Include your name, SSN and mailing address, and be sure to sign your request.

2. Review your ORB for accuracy and completeness. Any corrections or changes desired should be submitted with appropriate documentation through your servicing MILPO.

3. Review your OMPF to ensure that all OER and academic reports are on file and that other pertinent information authorized for filing is present. Study each frame to make certain that the document pertains to you and that none is missing. Don't panic if a recent OER or certificate is not on the microfiche. Your local MILPO can verify when the documents were forwarded to MILPERCEN.

4. If you haven't had a photograph taken in accordance with AR 640-30, visit the nearest photo lab and get it done. Insist that you see the finished product—and approve it—before it is mailed to MILPERCEN. If you don't like it, have another one taken.

5. If you have any last minute changes to submit or questions prior to the board, write or call your career manager. He or she will be able to review your board file, make pen and ink correction if necessary, and get back to you with an answer. Remember, though, that changes must be verified and processed through your local MILPO to become permanent. Begin early to allow the system enough time to work.

If everyone could be selected, there would be no need for DA centralized boards, but since selection quotas are limited, it is your responsibility to ensure that your records are as complete and accurate as possible. The system we have is tested, understood and equitable in terms of selecting those officers best qualified for advancement. Board members are hand picked for their experience, maturity and ability to make good recommendations. The next file they review may be yours. Will it be ready?



Proponency Notes

MIOAC Security Clearance Requirements Revised

The newly revised MI Officer Advanced Course began this October. With the start of this new course, emphasis needs to be placed on the requirement for all officers attending to have a current Special Background Investigation with final adjudication for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

Although the requirement for SCI access has been explicitly stated on assignment orders, many officers arrived without possessing a current SBI. However, SCI instruction was not introduced until the latter part of the course, normally allowing enough time for the Central Clearance Facility to conduct final adjudication on a student's security clearance prior to start of SCI instruction. With implementation of the revised MIOAC, this will no longer be the case. Now, a two-week course, entitled Tactical All Source Intelligence Officer Orientation, is a prerequisite to attendance at MIOAC. This course requires SCI access.

To prevent the potential problem of

students arriving without the necessary access, each officer should take the responsibility to ensure that he or she meets the security clearance requirements prior to arrival at Fort Huachuca. Waiting until receipt of assignment orders is probably too late to initiate the process when either an update or an initial SBI is required. To assist individuals in this effort, commanders and unit security managers must initiate and monitor the necessary clearance documentation in a timely manner. Those individuals assigned to SCI billets should ensure, prior to attendance at the course, that their debrief statements are forwarded to the Special Security Officer at Fort Huachuca, prior to departure. It is recommended that the officer be in receipt of the date/time group of the debrief message.

The point of contact for Individual Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine is Capt. Dana Kabana or Capt. Molly Baumert, AUTOVON 879-1022.

CRYPTOCORNER SOLUTION



Keyword in Cipher Alphabet: AGINCOURT

1876 ENTBBB
1973 CHINESE FARM
1954 DIEN BIEN PHU
1945 REMAGEN
1944 BULGE
1944 ARNHEM
1944 NORMANDY
1944 ANZIO
1944 CASSINO
1942 EL ALAMEIN
1942 STALINGRAD
1941 TORRUK
1941 KIEV
1941 CRETE
1918 BELLEAU WOOD
1917 CAMBRAI
1917 CAPORITTO
1914 TANNENBURG
1863 CHICKAMAUGA
1863 GETTYSBURG
1863 CHANCELLORSVILLE
1862 ANTIETAM
1862 SHILOH
1865 TCHERNAYA RIVER
1854 BALACLAVA
1854 SEVASTOPOL
1847 CHAPULTEPEC
1815 WATERLOO
1813 DRESDEN
1812 BORDINO
1809 WAGRAM
1807 EYLAU
1805 AUSTRALITZ
1781 YORKTOWN
1778 MONMOUTH
1775 LEXINGTON
1634 NORDLINGEN
1453 CONSTANTINOPLE
1415 AGINCOURT
1314 BANNOCKBURN
1191 ACRE
1066 HASTINGS
332 TYRE

Building Names Sought

During the next several months, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School will accept three new buildings in the Academic Complex at Fort Huachuca. Using a recently adopted USAICS Memorandum 1-6, a select committee will meet to consider honoring a deceased MI soldier by naming one of these new buildings in his or her name.

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Training Facility will be a permanent building that will be used to train the operators of the new JSTARS system. The Training Materiel Support Facility will issue training materials to resident students and send information to nonresident students. The third new facility, the Strategic Interrogator Debriefing Training Center, will provide classrooms, interrogation rooms and sup-

port areas for the students and faculty of the Strategic Debriefing Course.

USAICS solicits nominations from all MI units. Any individual who is nominated for this signal honor must have had an outstanding record as an MI soldier.

The USAICS Memorialization Committee will attempt to align the MI specialty of the nominee with the primary function of the new facility.

Send your nominations with supporting information not later than February 1, 1985 to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-SE-H (Dr. Saunders), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000. Additional information may be obtained from Dr. Bruce D. Saunders, USAICS Command Historian, at Autovon 879-5516/ 5750.

PROFESSIONAL READER

Strategy and the Defense Dilemma by Gerald Garvey, Lexington Books, 1984, 136 pages.

Professor Garvey's main thesis is that U.S. defense strategy must be changed. This concise yet highly informative book provides an interesting case for reorienting our nuclear, European and Asian defense strategies. Fundamentally, the problem with our nuclear posture is that mutually assured destruction is no longer credible inasmuch as it requires holding U.S. cities "hostage" to secure the allies from attack, but that it would be prohibitively expensive to build sufficient conventional forces to deter a frontal attack in Europe. This conclusion of Garvey's is particularly ironic in light of recent pronouncements that resources diverted from building nuclear weapons could be used to increase conventional capability and also fuel domestic programs. Garvey believes that the only likely Soviet attack on NATO is as a result of rising tension in a local conflict where doubt is cast on the viability of the Soviet regime. Accordingly, American policy must be designed to decrease the likelihood of tension in the "Eurasian rimland" where U.S. and Soviet interests intersect. One long range goal is to moderate Kremlin foreign policy by including Warsaw Pact countries in a new liberal economic order.

Garvey believes that we must revamp strategic coupling. We should declare that only a strategic attack on U.S. territory and not a conventional attack in Europe will elicit a strategic attack on the U.S.S.R. Such strategic forces as we keep should be placed on nuclear submarines. Inasmuch as conventional protection of NATO is too expensive, we will have to rely on nuclear forces. These should be highly accurate tactical weapons to be used early on in only a narrow FEBA. NATO should not abrogate first use because that possibility forces the Warsaw Pact to scatter its forces, thereby enhancing NATO conventional capabilities.

Garvey believes that our major goal should be to limit nuclear war so that the use of tactical weapons does not escalate into a strategic exchange. Accordingly, NATO should rely on forward defensive positions, not maneuverable defenses in depth. The former are cheaper and can make best use of precision guided munitions. By renouncing a second echelon response, Garvey believes that a signal would be sent to the Soviets that we want to avoid escalation. Clearly, Garvey is calling for the AirLand Battle Concept to be shelved. Increased reliance on cheaper tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would enable the U.S. to divert resources to Asia, where Garvey believes Ranger units should be deployed in a string of overseas depots. Additionally, a visible gun boat navy in the Indian Ocean should be emphasized in lieu of a large carrier group; the latter constitutes a vulnerable counterforce target.

Garvey's proposals are far-reaching. He puts perhaps too much faith in economics, believing that Eastern-bloc foreign policy can be moderated by drawing the Warsaw Pact into a new economic order. Similarly, he believes that Asian nations would readily agree to liberalize trade policies in exchange for protection against local aggression. Garvey is clearly correct in arguing that one global strategy is inadequate for both

frontal and local deterrence, and that special strategies are needed for both. This book is highly recommended as a thought-provoking critique of current defensive strategies.

1st Lt. Jay L. Spiegel
331st MI Company, 97th USARCOM
Fort Meade, Md.

American Defense Policy, Fifth Edition, edited by John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1982, 851 pages, \$14.95 paperback, \$35.00 cloth.

Representing the fifth iteration of an effort dating back to 1965, *American Defense Policy* is a collection of essays synthesized by the political science faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy. Each new edition seems to be greater both in quality and quantity than its predecessor. The third edition, for example, covered virtually the same ground in only 686 pages. Most of the 66 contributions are new since the previous edition was published five years ago, though there are some time-honored pieces that defense scholars will easily recognize. Most of the articles are merely reprinted from journals or excerpted from other books. Despite the obvious lack of originality in this approach, the pieces are not just thrown together haphazardly.

The editors cite as their purpose "to inform those interested in the story of defense policy—the student, the practitioner, and the concerned citizen alike—both of the substance of defense policy and the process by which it is made." This theme is accommodated nicely by the book's format, an innovation since the last edition. There are four parts, each divided into chapters preceded by excellent introductory essays. Through this vehicle, the editors provide a preview of the issues discussed in that chapter and explain how the articles included contribute to the overall theme. All but one of the eight chapters are divided into two sections. The "Principles and Issues" section offers articles that approach the subject on a theoretical or analytical basis. The "Implications" section comprises articles demonstrating how the topic impacts on such practical security matters as strategy formulation, weapons acquisition, and force development. Consequently, there is something for everyone—for the academic enamored with theoretical constructs and for the novice interested in the pragmatic side of current issues. By offering contrasting viewpoints in many cases, the articles are geared toward challenging serious students who have progressed beyond the level of the single-minded textbook approach.

Part I sets forth the background to some of the more enduring defense policy issues. Part II discusses the central strategies employed by the U.S. in its quest for security, while Part III delves into the process by looking at how defense policy is made. Probably of greatest interest to the average military reader is Part IV. This one-chapter wrap-up focuses on such salient issues as professional and ethical dilemmas, civil-military relations, manpower problems, and the

proper involvement by military personnel in politics. Each article is preceded by a 10-15 line abstract providing the author's background and a synopsis of the article. Between reading the abstracts and the introductory essays, the discriminating scholar can zero in on those issues of particular concern to him without wading helplessly through what would otherwise be a long and ponderous book. Also of tremendous assistance is the comprehensive list of additional readings at the end of each chapter.

I do not recommend the casual reader plunge in with the aim of reading the entire book. Its worth is best gleaned by sampling the smorgasbord of articles, some classics and some not. The anthology is truly eclectic. Included are articles by noted political scientists such as Samuel Huntington and Kenneth Waltz; military historians like Michael Howard; former military leaders and writers Sir John Hackett and Arthur Collins; international relations experts Robert Osgood and Hedley Bull; strategic theorist Colin Gray; and current government officials Richard Burt and Lawrence Korb. Of special interest are a few case studies, such as Edward Luttwak's account of how the Roman Empire made strategic responses to predicaments somewhat similar to those faced by the U.S. and Graham Allison's pioneer article on the Cuban missile crisis that was later expanded into his oft-quoted *Essence of Decision*.

In sum, *American Defense Policy* is worthwhile for its wealth of reference material on defense issues. It is not meant to be light reading or especially entertaining. That it succeeds on both these counts is testimony to the fact that only the serious and concerned citizen should purchase this book. The casual reader can utilize portions of it suiting his specific interests but it would be prudent to let the nearest library pay the high price to acquire this huge volume.

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The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine by Jonathan S. Lockwood, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1983, \$18.00.

An element of strategic planning is anticipating a potential foe's response to a newly announced strategic doctrine. This book by Capt. (Dr.) Jonathan S. Lockwood, who was assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School as a Soviet Threat instructor, is perhaps the first full-length work which analyzes the Soviet reaction to American strategic doctrine. Initially, Lockwood provides a historical overview of U.S. strategic developments from Dulles' massive retaliation through Carter's P.D. 59 and then traces the development of Soviet doctrine during the same period. The bulk of the book, however, outlines the Soviet propaganda response to each change in U.S. doctrine and then the real Soviet reaction to the doctrine.

Lockwood is able to distinguish between real responses to strategic developments and propaganda by examining the various Soviet publications on the subject and considering the nature of the publication and the author. Propagandistic statements can be identified by their intended purpose of reducing the credibility of U.S. strategic doctrine in terms of its deterrent

value against Soviet employment of an aggressive foreign policy. Consequently, Lockwood calls these statements declaratory deterrence. As a check to verify the real Soviet view of given U.S. doctrine, Soviet foreign policy behavior is compared to their analysis of the U.S. doctrine. By using a wide variety of sources including journals whose articles have prior approval of the C.P.S.U. and the formerly classified Soviet general staff publication, *Military Thought*, Lockwood enables the reader to view U.S. strategic doctrine through Soviet eyes.

Three themes emerge from the book. The first is that Soviet strategic planners view U.S. doctrine within the framework of their own strategic doctrine. This mirror imaging was particularly evident in the Soviet reaction to McNamara's assured destruction doctrine. Although this was an arms control strategy designed to provide a minimal nuclear capacity to inflict unacceptable damage following a Soviet surprise attack, the Soviets believed it to be a nuclear warfighting doctrine because all of their doctrines were designed to win a nuclear war. The Soviets similarly misinterpreted Nixon's policy of realistic deterrence. Lockwood also notes that the Soviets tend to view purely academic discussions of strategic doctrine as having the imprimatur of the government because all Soviet writings are approved by the government.

Even though the Soviets ultimately recognized that the U.S. was indeed moving toward a deterrence policy, the Kremlin was puzzled because according to Marxist-Leninist theory, imperialist America is inherently aggressive. The Soviets resolved this contradiction by concluding that the change in U.S. doctrine from a nuclear warfighting strategy was in response to the rapid growth in Soviet strategic power. This was particularly evident in the Soviet reaction to realistic deterrence and the abandonment of McNamara's flexible response in favor of assured destruction. Lockwood clearly states that if the Soviets perceive us as abandoning a nuclear warfighting doctrine because of the buildup in Soviet arms, then the incentive is for them to extract further concessions by building more arms than negotiating arms limitation.

Finally, Lockwood concludes that the Soviets treat U.S. strategic doctrine seriously only if we have sufficient military capabilities to match our strategic pronouncements. The initial Soviet reaction to Schlesinger's limited nuclear option policy of increased targeting flexibility was one of concern inasmuch as the Soviets perceived us as moving from a deterrence to nuclear warfighting strategy which included a possible preemptive strike. When, however, we neither developed an antiballistic missile system nor increased our civil defense posture to meet the requirements of a limited nuclear option strategy, the doctrine was quickly discredited. Accordingly, Lockwood recommends that the United States emphasize these two neglected areas in future strategic doctrine.

This thought provoking and timely book is a must for all those concerned with U.S. strategic planning. One hopes that Lockwood will similarly analyze the Soviet response to strategic developments during the Reagan administration.

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Psychic Warfare: Threat or Illusion? by Martin Ebon, McGraw-Hill, New York, 282 pages, \$15.95.

Psychic Warfare poses the strong possibility that some type of future warfare may include an Orwellian component. This does not mean that psychic warfare by itself will supplant the more traditional modes of war and the book's context tends to support this slant.

The book addresses the possible link between psychic phenomena, extrasensory perception, and mind control experiments with the future prospect of military application. There is strong evidence in Ebon's book that the military, scientific and intelligence communities of both the United States and the Soviet Union have and are making zealous attempts to harness the power and potential of the mind to do things such as move objects, to perceive events that have not yet occurred, and to span time, distance and space across all ideological and political boundaries. There have been attempts by U.S. and Soviet scientists, plus scientists from nonaligned nations, to "pool" the results of past psychic experiments. Ebon's book states that the Soviets are playing down their interest in psychic applications, but in reality are mounting a large effort to gain supremacy in this relatively new scientific field.

The author's basic premise is that all persons are endowed with extrasensory ability, but do not consciously apply it in their daily lives. There are, however, a relatively small number of persons that are keenly aware of their psychic gifts that, under controlled scientific conditions, appear to experience visual and sensory perceptions "normal" people have not been able to experience. The author contends that "normal" persons have similar psychic experiences on occasion without being able to explain the "occurrence."

Mind altering, psychotronics and extrasensory perception can be frightening when further explored. Ebon illustrates this by explaining a case in which the CIA conducted experiments using persons with keen psychic gifts to contact agents that had died while on operational missions (CIA spy Oleg Penkovsky, for one). The agency's justification for the experiments was "to determine the circumstances of apprehension, methods of interrogation, and the degree of information disclosed during interrogation(s)."

The military communities of both superpowers are aware of the possibilities in the areas of intelligence and communications that psychic warfare could afford them, some which could enable them to "see" and "hear" into enemy territory without actually having to send an operational asset across national boundaries.

The ultimate use of psychic power would be projection of mind power to a specific location, say 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, the KGB headquarters in Moscow, and actually "picking up" information without the KGB knowing what is happening. Of course, the situation could be reversed.

It all comes down to which nation wants it enough to commit the money and scientific resources required. If successful psychic warfare does occur in the near future, it would mean that the nation using it first would have the potential of keeping it secret from the rest of the world for an undeterminable period. Once the secret is out, however, there would be no telling what impact it would have on our planet's power


centers, and worse, how would further development and use be controlled. Some means would have to be found to curtail proliferation of this new "weapon."

After reading this exciting book, I came away with the impression that *Psychic Warfare* is an addition to the "Star Wars" package primarily because of the vast possibilities in collecting military information through mind power. As time goes on, new military uses should not be discounted if a nation is willing to invest a substantial part of its military, industrial and scientific resources toward achieving it.

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Crossword solution





Symbolism

The Teutonic helmet with crown are allusions to Camp King in Oberursel, Germany, and its front facing position suggests alertness and vigilance. The laurel branches on either side are symbolic of honor and achievement. In the collar the colors black and white denote the two types of intelligence provided by the group and the repetition of the pattern indicates the overall coverage of Europe.

513th

Military Intelligence Group

On October 22, 1952, the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group was constituted in the Regular Army, and on January 15, 1953, was activated at Oberursel, Germany (Camp King). The 513th was assigned to the U.S. Army, Europe and replaced a TD organization, the 7077th USAREUR Intelligence Center. In its administrative and intelligence support role, the 513th managed an interrogation center for refugees, resettlers, and repatriates; collected documents; issued reports; and oversaw technical intelligence detachments. On October 20, 1953, the 513th was redesignated the 513th Military Intelligence Group.

The mission of the 513th changed in early 1954 when it gained responsibility for field operations intelligence, a newly recognized discipline within the Army. To handle the mission, a part of which was transferred to the 66th CIC Group, the 522nd MI Battalion was activated on July 22, 1954, and assigned to the 513th MI Group. Although the 513th MI Group exercised administrative control over the 522nd MI Battalion, USAREUR held operational control. It was not until August 1958, when the 522nd was inactivated, that the 513th MI Group gained operational control over FOI functions and personnel who were absorbed into the 513th internal organization. Because of its specialized mission and

need for flexibility, the 513th was organized into a variety of provisional organizations (battalions, companies and detachments) from 1957 on.

The 513th's mission again changed with the acquisition of counterintelligence functions on November 1, 1959, when USAREUR divided the counterintelligence and field operations intelligence/area intelligence functions between the 66th CIC Group and the 513th MI Group, the latter covering northern Germany to include Berlin. This division was short-lived due to the inherent coordination problems.

On July 25, 1961, the 513th was redesignated as the 513th Intelligence Corps Group. On April 1, 1962, another realignment of intelligence units in Germany witnessed the 513th INTC Group taking over the mission of area intelligence for the entire geographical area of Germany. On December 28, 1963, the 513th assumed personnel and area intelligence mission of the inactivated 163rd MI Battalion, which had been in support of the Southern European Task Force. On October 15, 1966, the 513th INTC Group was again redesignated as the 513th Military Intelligence Group.

As a result of a major reorganization and consolidation of Army intelligence assets in Europe, the 513th was moved from Camp King, Oberur-

sel, Germany, to McGraw Kaserne, Munich, Germany, in October 1968. During the previous month, the 66th MI Group had been relocated from Stuttgart, Germany, to Munich. It was determined that the 66th MI Group, the senior of the units, would remain, and that the 513th would be inactivated. Over the following nine months, the personnel and mission of the 513th were merged with those of the 66th, culminating in the formal inactivation of the 513th on June 25, 1969.

The 513th MI Group was reactivated at Fort Monmouth, N.J., on October 2, 1982, to receive the assignment of personnel and equipment. In its new role, the 513th and its subordinate units are to furnish active Army units throughout the continental United States with intelligence, security, and electronic warfare support and provide Army Reserve intelligence units with training support.

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